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ON APOLOGY AND CONSILIENCE
Erin Ann O'Hara* and Douglas Yam**
Abstract: This Article joins the current debate about the proper relationship between
apology and the law. Several states are considering legislation designed to shield apologies
from the courtroom, and mediators are increasing their focus on the importance of apologies.
The article develops an evolutionary economic analysis of apology that combines the tools of
economics, game theory, and biology to more fully understand its role in dispute resolution.
When the analysis is applied to the uses of apology before and at trial, a more sophisticated
understanding of the relationship between apology and the law emerges.
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INTRODUCTION
Two first-grade girls threw a kindergartener from the school's monkey
bars during recess, breaking his arm. The injured child was rushed to the
hospital, and the girls were sent to the principal's office. Although they
responded quickly and effectively once summoned, the children's
teachers were nowhere in sight during the incident. Two days later, the
mother of the boy expressed anger to her lawyer-neighbor over the
failure of the teacher, the school, and the girls to apologize to her and her
son. Thinking like a lawyer, the neighbor unwisely attempted to reason
with the mother by remarking that the school and the teacher could not
apologize without subjecting the public school district to legal liability.
This further provoked the mother, who responded, "I don't care about the
money or the medical bills! My son is owed an apology and I deserve
some assurance that the playground will be better supervised in the
future! The attitude that you express makes me MORE, not less, likely to
want to sue the *#/o*s!!!" 1
This incident encapsulates the problem of apology in dispute
resolution. Victims desire an apology.' Apology is an important
component of dispute resolution, and any useful model of conflict
resolution must acknowledge a human preference for apologies. At the
same time, an apology is an admission against interests, which, under
American evidentiary rules, can be introduced at trial to help prove
liability.' An apology can prevent litigation, but apology and litigation
1. From an experience of one of the authors. A recent Associated Press story illustrates a similar
sentiment. A school bus collided with a freight train and three school children were killed. The
mother of one of the victims thought that the bus driver should be imprisoned, but her statement to
the press indicated that her resentment had as much to do with the driver's failure to apologize as it
had to do with her reckless driving: "She has not once tried to say she was sorry ... she was at fault.
She broke the law, and she should have to pay for it." Mother of Bus Victim Says DriverHasn't
Apologized, THE TENNESSEAN, Dec. 15, 2001, at 2B.
2. Third parties' perceptions of justice also are affected by apologies. An experimental study of
amnesty grants in South Africa indicated that subjects' perceptions of the unfairness of a particular
grant of amnesty were significantly affected by the offering and acceptance of an apology to the
victim's family. James L. Gibson, Truth, Justice and Reconciliation: Judging the Fairness of
Amnesty in South Africa, AM. J. POL. SC. (forthcoming 2002).
3. Rule 801(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent part:
A statement is not hearsay if.... [t]he statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party's
own statement, in either an individual or representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the
party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized
by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent
or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the
existence of the relationship ....
FED R. EVID. 801(d). See also Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons 32
(October 8, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) [hereinafter Legislating
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appear to be operating at cross purposes. While the victim desires an
apology to resolve the dispute, the potential defendant is hesitant to issue
one in anticipation of a lawsuit.
Forgone apologies impose costs on transgressors as well as victims.
Wrongdoers often want to be forgiven, and concomitantly, may feel an
urge to apologize. These desires to apologize and to receive forgiveness
are themselves important human emotions that can enable a transgressor
to overcome the conflicting emotions of shame and humiliation to press
for reconciliation.4 Any hesitation that results from our legal rules can
exacerbate cognitive dissonance in the transgressor, and may foreclose
apology, forgiveness, and reconciliation where they would otherwise be
forthcoming.
The urge to apologize may at times, overcome significant potential
negative legal consequences. Consider a recent, very public example that
arose out of the accidental sinking of the Japanese fishing vessel, Ahene
Maru, by the nuclear submarine, U.S.S. Greenville. On March 28, 2001,
during the Naval inquiry the Greenville's captain, Commander Scott
Waddle, asked to meet with the families of Ahene Maru's lost
crewmembers. As one of the fathers related the encounter, "[Commander
Waddle] bowed and they saw his tears hit the floor. It had a profound
effect. Kazuo Nakafa, the father of a fishing instructor whose son is
missing at sea, did not understand much English, but he said.., he
understood two of Waddle's words very clearly: ... 'very sorry.' ... At
that moment his anger suddenly dissipated."5 Although it was clear that
his career was finished, Commander Waddle was also facing a possible
court marshal and prison time, so his act of apology was made "against
legal advice." In fact, when he first attempted to apologize, his attorneys
successfully dissuaded him from doing so.6 Like Commander Waddle,

Apology] ("for centuries evidence law has provided that admissions by party opponents are
admissible") (emphasis in original).
4. As discussed in Part I, infra, an effective apology typically enhances a transgressor's feelings
of shame and humiliation because it requires the transgressor to occupy a position of moral
inferiority to the victim.
5. All Things Considered: Submarine Week (NPR Radiobroadcast, Mar. 9, 2001), available at
http.//search.npr.org/cf/cnm/segment-display.cfm?seglD=-1 19723 (last visited Oct. 10, 2002).
6. A few weeks earlier, Commander Waddle's attorney-advised partial apology, in which he
expressed regret but took no responsibility for the incident, was not accepted. Kris Frieswick, Say
You're Sorry, CFO MAG., May 1, 2000, at http://cfo.comlarticle/1,5309,2922,00.html (last visited
Oct. 15,2002).
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other transgressors report acting on conscience despite the potential legal
consequences.'
In the face of a heartfelt apology, victims, like the father of the
Japanese student, similarly report feeling a near instantaneous erosion of
anger and pain. Interestingly, the emotional healing process often seems
to occur outside the will of the victim. Using a personal example, one of
us was angry with her spouse for an entire afternoon, mentally rehearsing
the outraged speech she would deliver to her husband when she returned
home. However, by the time that she had gotten six words into the
speech, her husband stopped her with an elaborate and heart-felt apology.
She felt the anger dissipate so quickly that she found herself protesting
that she wasn't finished being angry. She attempted twice to articulate
her anger and pain, but despite these apparent efforts to the contrary, she
had lost her conviction.
In contrast, victims who receive no apology can become angry and
vindictive, pursuing litigation at a cost that far exceeds any rational
expectation of monetary award.8 Returning to the playground incident,
perhaps the lawyer-neighbor, who is one of this article's authors was
correct in assuming that the school was making an economically rational
decision to remain silent for fear of legal exposure? Unfortunately, the
decision to express this assumption clearly enraged the injured boy's
mother and may have had the unwanted effect of increasing the risk of a
lawsuit. Indeed, recent literature provides ample anecdotal evidence that
plaintiffs are more likely to sue when they do not get an apology, and
more likely to forgo compensation when they receive one."
7. Jonathan Cohen reports a story about a lawyer who, after several days' consideration, wrote a
letter of apology to a woman whose car he hit while driving. Jonathan R Cohen, Advising Clients to
Apologize, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1009, 1056-58 (1999) [hereinafter Advising Clients]. Conversely,
some people will refuse to apologize even when the monetary costs of doing so are nominal.
8. For a story about a trial over a missing snowman figure on a $38.00 gingerbread house, see
Paula M. Young, Mediation and the Power of an Apology: The Case of the Missing Snowman,
MISSOURi LAWYERS WEEKLY, Apr. 2000.
9. Cf. Stephen B. Goldberg et al., Saying You're Sorry, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 221, 222 (1987)
(recounting commonplace advice from insurance companies to policyholders not to express
sympathy to parties injured by policyholders so as to avoid potential liability). Notice that the
individual's motivation to apologize can be in tension with the incentives of an entity that bears
potential legal liability. Insurers prefer that policyholders not apologize, and employers similarly
might prefer that erring employees withhold apologies. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and
Organizations:Exploring An Example from Medical Malpractice,27 FORDHAM URB. L. 1447,
1468-70 (2000) [hereinafter Apology and Organizations](discussing principal-agent tensions in the
context of dispute resolution).
10. See Apology and Organizations,supra note 9, at 1447-63 (discussing policy of Kentucky
hospital to apologize to patients for errors and reporting possible decrease in costs as result of
policy); Steven Keeva, Does Law Mean Never Having to Say You're Sorry, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1999, at
64, 65 (estimating that 30% of medical malpractice cases could be avoided with a simple apology);
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Such behavior is confounding from a simple law and economics
perspective under which decisions to sue and settle are asserted to
depend only upon 1) the parties' estimates of the likelihood that the
plaintiff will win, 2) the dollar value of the award, and 3) the costs of
trial and judgment enforcement." Although these are undoubtedly
important determinants of individual decision making, the calculated,
cool quantitative logic of such models ignores apology as a valued
method of dispute resolution. Setting aside for the moment the less
tangible value of apology, the anecdotal evidence suggests that apology
can be very valuable, in dollar terms, to disputing parties. In the context
of wrongdoing, people often value apology more than monetary
compensation. Ford and Firestone had to broadcast a videotaped apology
on national television to reach a settlement with a women paralyzed by
an accident caused by a roll-over of a Ford Explorer with defective
Firestone tires. 2 In the face of several attractive monetary offers, Paula
Jones demanded-but never received-an apology from President
Clinton as a condition of settlement.' 3 Many lawyers are cognizant of the
value of apology,' 4 and experienced negotiators and mediators have

Deborah L Levi, The Role ofApology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L REV. 1165, 1167 (1997) (stating
that apology can often move parties closer to settlement); Peter H. Rehm & Denise R. Beatty, The
Legal Consequences ofApologizing, 1996 J. DiSP. RESOL. 115, 117 (1996) (noting that apologies
can diffuse anger and help avoid litigation).
11. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics and Settlement: A New
Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 78 (1997) (law and economics models
traditionally "assume that litigants seek to maximize their wealth through the legal system").
Important early law and economics models of suit and settlement include Richard A. Posner, An
EconomicApproach to Legal ProcedureandJudicialAdministration,2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, (1973),
and George L Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection ofDisputesfor Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
1 (1984). The literature in the field is now vast. For reviews of the models and refinements, see
Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their
Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067 (1989); Andrew F. Daughety, Settlement, in THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000). In
contrast, Peter Huang has attempted to model emotions into litigation decisions. See generally Peter
H. Huang, EmotionalResponses in Litigation, 12 INT'L. REV. L. & ECON. 31 (1992).
12. Frieswick, supranote 6.
13. See The Paula Jones Settlement, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1998, at C6. In lieu of an apology,
Clinton ended up paying Jones $850,000. See Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Settles Jones Lawsuit with a
Checkfor $850,000, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 13, 1999, at A14.
14. In a survey of one state's bar association, 83% of responding lawyers agreed that apology
alone could settle many disputes. See Douglas Yam, Survey of Lawyers' Attitudes Toward ADR,
conducted on behalf of the Georgia Supreme Court's Commissions on Dispute Resolution and
Professionalism, on file with author. See also Goldberg et al., supra note 9 (noting that sometimes
the injured party only wants the other party to admit wrongdoing); Keeva, supra note 10, at 65
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witnessed15how apologies can bridge considerable distances in negotiating
positions.
Failure to take into account these human tastes for apology and
forgiveness can have significant consequences, and yet these important,
emotion-laden preferences have historically garnered little attention from
our formal legal system. Recently, proponents of apology and
forgiveness, particularly from the alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
movement, have urged increased sensitivity to the uses and nuances of
these behaviors and their effect on the resolution of disputes. 6 In direct
response to the perceived conflict between apology and litigation, some
commentators promote evidentiary reforms that provide "safe harbors. 17
In these safe harbors, parties can apologize without acting contrary to
legal advice, like Commander Waddle, or increasing their civil liability
exposure, as the school may have feared. Several states have already
responded by considering the adoption of apology-friendly legislation."
(claiming close to 30% of medical malpractice cases would never have occurred if doctor bad
apologized).
15. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriersto Litigation Settlement: An
Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REv. 107, 148 (1994), in which the authors conducted an
experiment that showed tenants are more likely to accept $900 settlement offer from landlord when
it was accompanied by an apology than when it was offered without an apology.
16. See, e.g., Hiroshi Wagasuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications ofApology: Law and Culture
in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 461, 495 (1986) (advocating greater use of
apology in American legal system); Levi, supra note 10, at 1167; Max Bolstad, Learning From
Japan: The Case For Increased Use of Apology in Mediation, 48 CLEV. ST. L REv. 545, 569-78
(2000) (urging the use of apology in mediation based on the experience of the Japanese); see
generally NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION
121 (1991).
17. Cohen, Advising Clients, supra note 7, at 1031-42, 1061-64; Aviva Orenstein, Apology
Excepted: Incorporatinga Feminist Analysis Into Evidence Policy Where You Would Least Expect
It, 28 Sw.U. L. REv. 221,247-55 (1999).
18. Massachusetts has excluded the admissibility of statements, writings and gestures expressing
sympathy or benevolence. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D. The law arose after the killer of a state
legislator's daughter failed to apologize out of fear of legal consequences. See Lee Taft, Apology
Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 1151 (2000). Texas and
California have enacted similar legislation. See TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (West
1997 & Supp. 2002) (rendering inadmissible "a communication that ...expresses sympathy or a
general sense of benevolence relating to the pain, suffering, or death of an individual involved in an
accident," but rendering admissible "statements concerning negligence or culpable conduct
pertaining to an accident or event"); CAL. EVID. CODE §1160 (rendering inadmissible benevolent
and sympathetic statements and gestures); see generally William K. Bartels, Note, The Stormy Seas
ofApologies: CaliforniaEvidence Code Section 1160 Provides a Safe Harborfor Apologies Made
After Accidents, 28 W. STATE U. L. REV. 141 (2000-01). However, these statutes fall short of
protecting apologies that admit liability or fault. More recently, West Virginia, Connecticut, and
Hawaii have begun to consider changes in evidence rules that would specifically exclude evidence of
apologies. See Legislating Apology, supra note 5, at 19-22 (discussing enacted, proposed and
pending apology legislation).
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Moreover, the use of court-ordered or "coerced" apologies in criminal
cases appears to be on the rise.19 Apology is considered an important
objective in victim-offender mediation.2" It is also a topic of increasing
interest for mediators in civil disputes2 because the mediation forum
already protects apologies, partial or full,' from use at trial.' In a
conscious decision to satisfy the preference for apology, businesses and
hospitals are among the institutions that are experimenting with apology
policies in an effort to reduce their liability.24
The movement for strengthening the role of apology in law while
providing it more protection from the legal system is not without
criticism. Critics of this movement maintain that coerced, "partial," and
protected apologies, as well as those induced by intervening parties such
as judges and mediators, are less meaningful and without sufficient
moral weight to lead to forgiveness and reconcile parties.25 Indeed, it is
argued that such "commodified" apologies can undermine the
fundamental value of apology in reconciliation efforts.26 In reply, one
commentator argues that such apologies are valuable nonetheless
because they satisfy a variety of individual and societal interests other
than reconciliation.2 7
This Article joins the emerging debate by exploring the question of
how the legal system should treat apology, if at all, through the lens of
evolutionary biology and economics. Part I examines the components
19. Elizabeth Latif, Note, Apologetic Justice: Evaluating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal
Solutions, 81 B.U. L REv. 289,296-98 (2001).
20. This is largely associated with the restorative justice movement See, e-g., MARK J. UMBRErr,
VIcTIM MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND MEDIATION 18-22 (1994);
Rose Ruddick, A Court-Referred Scheme, in MEDIATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: VICTIMS,
OFFENDERS AND COMMUNITY 82, 85 (Martin Wright & Burt Galaway eds., 1989) [hereinafter
MEDIATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE]; June Veevers, Pre-CourtDiversionfor Juvenile Offenders, in
MEDIATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra, at 69, 74-76; Latif, supra note 19, at 292-95. See also
John 0. Haley, Apology and Pardon:LearningFrom Japan, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 842 (1998)
(advocating that concepts of apology used in Japanese criminal proceedings can be applied in the
U.S.).
21. See supranote 10.
22. "Partial" apologies are expressions of sympathy or benevolence for the injured person's
condition without admitting fault or responsibility for the causal act. Advising Clients,supra note 7,
at 1030. See infra notes 35-63 and accompanying text for discussion of the elements necessary for
full apologies.
23. See, e-g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1(1). For a compilation of such laws, see SARAH R. COLE
ET AL., I MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, & PRACTICE app. A (2d ed. 1994).
24.
25.
26.
27.

See Apology and Organizations,supra note 9.
Taft, supranote 18, at 1146-49.
Id.
Latif, supranote 19, at 311-20.
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and nuances of individual apology as described by the legal, sociological,
and social psychological literature. The nuances of apology described in
Part I are better understood in the context of evolved human
predispositions toward deception and discernment. Part II uses tools of
evolutionary biology and economic analysis to place apology and
forgiveness more broadly into human interaction as co-evolved
behaviors. Using the analysis developed in Part II, Part HI considers!fie
role of apology and forgiveness in the context of trial and provides a
cost-benefit framework for more careful consideration of the use of
apology in the courtroom.
Throughout this Article we focus on private rather than public
apology. We primarily address apology in the context of the dyadic
relationship between the victim and the transgressor.2

Thus, by

implication, we may have much more to say about individualistic rather
than communal societies.2 9 Moreover, we treat forgiveness in the context
28. Nicholas Tavuchis comments that "whatever the actual or conceptual status of the relevant
units (individuals, corporate entities, or collectivities), the fundamental pattern of sociation in
apologetic discourse is dyadic. That is to say, its exclusive, ultimate, and ineluctable focus is upon
interaction between the primordial social categories of Offender and Offended." TAVUCHIS, supra
note 16, at 46 (emphasis in original).
29. Much of the validity of a biological explanation for behavior rests on the relative universality
of the behavior in question. The social psychologists and linguists either assume or-in the case of
politeness theory, discussed infra in Part II.A.-document the widespread existence of apologetic
behaviors. See generally PENELOPE BRoWN & STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, POLITENESS: SOME
UNIVERSALS IN LANGUAGE USAGE (1987). Some psychologists have compared Japanese and
American children and concluded they react similarly to transgressions and to apologies despite
socialization in different cultural contexts. See generally Ken-Ichi Ohbuchi & Kobun Sato,
Children'sReactions to MitigatingAccounts: Apologies, Excuses, and Intentionality of Harm, 134 J.
SOC. PSYCHOL. 5-17 (1999) (citing V.L. Hamilton et al., Credit and Blame Among American and
Japanese Children: Normative, Cultural, and Individual Differences, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 442 (1990)).
The anthropological and ethnographic literature is less conclusive on this subject; we conclude
that apologetic and forgiveness behaviors are universal although their expression and frequency vary
with the particular situation and cultural milieu. The only directly relevant study attempting a crosscultural survey of apology simply indicates that apology is more prevalent in some societies than in
others. See Letitia Hickson, The Social Contexts of Apology in DisputeSettlement: A Cross-Cultural
Study, 25 ETHNOLOGY 283 (1986). Hickson indicates that apology may be a more predominant
dispute resolution mechanism in hierarchical societies. Unfortunately, the researcher is relying on
ethnographic reports gathered over more than a one hundred year period by other researchers who
may not have been looking for apologetic behavior or who may have defined apologetic behavior or
apologetic discourse differently. While not arguing or supporting the conclusion that apology exists
in some societies and not others, Hickson does make a good argument that cultures differ to the
extent to which their members stress apology as a remediative technique. She argues that an apology
is particularly important to speed settlement in societies with a hierarchical, kin-based political
organization and in societies in which children's most frequent companions are adults as opposed to
older children or peers. Either factor alone may predispose members of a culture to use apology
more often. She finds three elements that together promote a cultural emphasis on apology: "(1)
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of its relationship to apology, often ignoring a fuller treatment of
forgiveness as an independent subject. Although we believe our analysis
can enlighten the important and growing role of apology in criminal law,
this article focuses on civil dispute resolution. A more comprehensive
evolutionary economic approach would successfully analyze the role of
apology, forgiveness, and reintegration in a more comprehensive
ethnographic context and in both civil and criminal contexts. At best,
then, this Article represents a useful beginning rather than an end to an
evolutionary economic analysis of the subject.
We reach a number of conclusions, the most important of which is
that both sides of the debate on the admissibility of apology fail to fully
appreciate the effect of the evidentiary rules on the incentive to
apologize. Importantly, the apology scholars have focused on the role of
apology evidence in establishing liability, but they have neglected the
fact that apology evidence very often has the practical effect of reducing
damages. We consider this dual role for apology at trial and the
incentives that admissibility creates for both parties. We conclude that in

restrictions on mobility and hence a compelling interest in the continuation of important
relationships; (2) a social context that promotes complimentary, hierarchical forms of behavior; and
(3) the tendency to define disputes as challenges to reputation." Id. at 292.
The dichotomy between so-called "shame" and "guilt" cultures may explain some of the cultural
variability in apologetic behavior. In a shame-based culture, tradition, expressed through myth and
ritual, provides the individual with a set of ideal rules of behavior and character traits with which to
emulate and compare oneself and one's actions. There is intense pressure to conform and severe
negative sanctions for ignoring tradition. The individual identifies closely with the group. In guiltbased societies, the individual is more differentiated from the group, and guilt, an internal sense of
deviation from the social code, replaces shame as the social construct guiding moral behavior.
Arguably, self-differentiation and self-awareness and therefore guilt is promoted by literacy, leading
one psychologist to conclude that the concept of forgiveness can have different meaning in guilt
cultures. Michael C. Luebbert, The Survival Value of Forgiveness, in EvOLUTION OF THE PSYCHE
169, 185 (David H. Rosen & Michael C. Luebbert eds., 1999). But guilt has not replaced shame
entirely in any society, and at the level of behavioral biology, the distinction is irrelevant as both
shame and guilt only serve to reinforce ingrained conciliatory behaviors such as apology and
forgiveness. Indeed, past labeling of Japan and the West as shame and guilt cultures respectively has
been strongly questioned as a valid distinction in the context of apologies. See TAVUCHIS, supra note
16, at 37-44.
Similar distinctions have been drawn between collectivist and individualist cultures in the context
of apology. Collectivist culture members may be more likely to apologize for the actions of other
members of the group and to frame apologies in more relational terms, whereas individualistic
culture members are less likely to make apologies for others and the apologies are presented in more
personal terms. Harry C. Triandis, Individualism and Collectivism: Past, Present, and Future, in
HANDBOOK OF CULTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY 35,39 (David Matsumoto ed., 2001).
We do not intend to take a position one way or another on the magnitude or importance of cultural
differences in the context of apology except to assert that reconciliatory behaviors, of which apology
and forgiveness are expressions, are present in all human cultures for reasons articulated in the next
part of this article. Of course, the expressions may vary substantially across cultures.
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order to prevent possible opportunism by both transgressors and victims,
generally evidence of apology should either be admitted at all phases of
litigation or excluded entirely from the courtroom. Furthermore, the
choice between these two options likely must turn on considerations
other than the effect of admissibility on apology. In short, so long as
evidence of apology can be considered at all phases or none of a civil
trial, the present debate on its admissibility is largely irrelevant. On the
other hand, the evidence rules might matter for those legal situations
where damages matter more than the prospect of liability or vice versa.
We also conclude that a taste for both apology and forgiveness, rooted in
biology, causes people to consistently overvalue them in non-repeat
interactions and creates a situation ripe for strategic abuse in large,
complex, less-interdependent societies.
Quite separate from our normative conclusions, we consider this
article to be an exercise in consilience, "the linking of fact and fact-based
theory across disciplines to create a common groundwork of
explanation."3 We believe that recent advances in evolutionary theory
and a growing awareness of biological influences on behavior enrich the
usefulness of economic models of legal behavior. Such advances also
provide a firmer foundation and common frame of reference for policy
dialogue around this and many other issues in the law. Moreover, we
hope to show that the social scientific literature on the Prisoner's
Dilemma" needs to focus more on the importance of conciliation and the
30. EDWARD 0. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 8 (1998).
31. In its classic form:
two individuals are imprisoned and accused of having cooperated to perform some crime. The
two prisoners are held separately, and attempts are made to induce each one to implicate the
other. If neither one does, both are set free. This is the cooperative strategy. In order to tempt
one or both to defect, each is told that a confession implicating the other will result in his or her
release and, in addition, a small reward. If both confess, each one is imprisoned. But if one
individual implicates the other, and not vice versa, then the implicated partner receives a harsher
sentence than if each had implicated the other. We can symbolize the payoffs as follows: T is
the temptation to implicate the other; R is the reward that each one gets if neither one defects; P
is the punishment each one gets if both defect; and S is the sucker's payoff, the penalty one
suffers if implicated by the partner. Thus, T > R > P > S ....
The dilemma is: If each one thinks rationally, then each one will decide that the best course is to
implicate the other, thus making both worse off than if each had decided to trust the other.
Consider the first individual's problem: If his partner fails to implicate him, then he himself
ought to implicate his partner in order to gain T instead of R; and if his partner implicates him,
then it will be better for him to implicate his partner, since he will then suffer P instead of S.
ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 390 (1985). The Prisoner's Dilemma disregards ethical
considerations; it is simply rational to be selfish in this moral vacuum whenever the temptation to
defect exceeds the benefits of cooperation. For a discussion of the Prisoner's Dilemma story, see
Phillip D. Straffin, Jr., The Prisoner'sDilemma, 1 U.M.A.P. JOURNAL 103 (1980). For general
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role of biology in diffusing conflict and restoring cooperation. At the
same time, we hope to help shift the focus of current law and biology
scholarship away from a single-minded use of evolutionary theory to
predict and analyze egoistic, socially-destructive behaviors." It is time
for this new field of legal scholarship to press beyond rape, murder,
sexual harassment and child abuse to explore more fully the biological
roots of altruism, cooperation, and conciliation and their relationship to
law and policy.3
I.

APOLOGY AND ITS NUANCES

Apology is a somewhat amorphous phenomenon, the essence of which
is difficult to capture in words. However, we all seem to know this
phenomenon when we observe or experience it. In the social psychology
literature, apologies are described generally as admissions of

treatment of the paradigm, see R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAiFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 94102 (1967); ANATOL RAPOPORT & ALBERT M. CHAMMAH, PRISONER'S DILEMMA, A STORY IN
CONFLICr AND COOPERATION (1965).
32. See generally Kingsley R. Browne, An Evolutionary Perspective on Sexual Harassment:
Seeking Roots in Biology Rather Than Ideology, 8 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 5, 8-9 (1997) ("much
of the conflict that is labeled 'sexual harassment' is traceable in part to the fact that evolution has
resulted in conflicting interests between the sexes, which in turn has resulted in different sexual
psychologies in men and women"); Kingsley R Browne, Women at War: An Evolutionary
Perspective,49 BUFF. L REV. 51 (2001) (greater male preference for risk-taking and aggressiveness
reproductively advantageous and helps explain male warrior spirit as well as the rape and
enslavement of women in war); Laura M. Sullivan, Note, An Evolutionary Perspective of Peer
Sexual Harassment in American Schools: Premising Liability on Sexual, Rather Than Power
Dynamics, 3 VM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 329 (1997); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Children at Risk:
The Sexual Exploitation of Female ChildrenAfter Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 251 (2001); Owen
D. Jones, Realities of Rape: Of Science and Politics, Causes and Meanings, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
1386 (2001); Owen D. Jones, Law and The Biology of Rape: Reflections on Transitions, 11
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 151 (2000); Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture and the Biology of Rape:
Toward Explanationand Prevention, 87 CAL. L REV. 827 (1999); Cheryl Hanna, Can A Biological
Inquiry Help Reduce Male Violence Against Females?, 22 VT. L. REV. 333 (1997); Brian Kennan,
EvolutionaryBiology and StrictLiabilityfor Rape, 22 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 131 (1998); Owen D.
Jones, EvolutionaryAnalysis in Law: An Introduction and Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L.
REV. 1117 (1997) [hereinafter Child Abuse]; Symposium on Biology and Sexual Aggression: Part I,
39 JuriMRIcS J. (Winter 1999); Symposium on Biology and Sexual Aggression: Part II, 39
JURiMETRICS (Spring 1999).
33. Some efforts along these lines have already been made. See, generally, THE SENSE OF
JUSTICE: BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW (ROGER D. MASTERS & MARGARET GRUTER, eds.,
1992); Christopher Badcock, Reciprocity and the Law, 22 VT. L REV. 295 (1997); E. Donald Elliott,
The Tragi-Comedy of the Commons: Evolutionary Biology, Economics and EnvironmentalLaw, 20
VA. ENVTL. LJ. 17 (2001); Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law's
Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U. L REv. 1141, 1176-77
(2001) (providing biological explanation for human tendency toward excess cooperation).
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blameworthiness and regret for doing harm.34 Because an apology
accepts both responsibility and blameworthiness, it differs from excuse,
explanation, and justification, which all attempt to deflect or deny
blameworthiness. Apologies can be effective tools for de-escalating
conflicts and avoiding the negative consequences of bad actions."
Related to apology is the likewise amorphous concept of forgiveness.
Forgiveness is a primary object of apology. 6 It precedes apology's
ultimate object: reconciliation, a return to the relationship that existed
before the transgression. 7 Although both apology and forgiveness
involve interpersonal interactions, forgiveness is also an intra-psychic
phenomenon of cognitive restructuring that can occur independent of
both an apology and the victim's external marifestations of
forgiveness. 8 In genuine forgiveness, the victim of an unjust injury
voluntarily abandons her resentment and her desire to retaliate.39 We
focus on apology in this paper, but our supposition is that apology and
forgiveness are significantly intertwined emotional phenomena.
A.

DefiningApology

In recent years, sociologists, social psychologists, moral philosophers,
and legal commentators have attempted to distill the essence of effective
34. See, e.g., Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker, Children s Reactions to Apologies, 43 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 742, 742 (1982); Bruce W. Darby & Barry R. Schlenker,
Children's Reactions to Trangressions:Effects ofthe Actor's Apology, Reputation and Remorse, 28
BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 353, 353 (1989) [hereinafter Children'sReactions to Transgressions].
35. See Children's Reactions to Trangressions,supra note 34, at 353-54; Ohbuchi & Sato, supra
note 29, at 5-17.
36. Tavuchis' primary argument on the topic of apology is that "the singular achievement of
apologetic discourse paradoxically resides in its capacity to effectively eradicate the consequences of
the offense by evoking the unpredictable faculty of forgiveness." TAVUCHIS, supranote 16, at viii.
37. Reconciliation is distinguishable from apology and forgiveness, both of which facilitate and
are motivated by possible reconciliation. See Everett L. Worthington, Jr., The Pyramid Model of
Forgiveness: Some Interdisciplinary Speculations about Unforgiveness and the Promotion of
Forgiveness, in DIMENSIONS OF FORGIVENESS: PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH & THEOLOGICAL

PERSPECTIVES 107, 129-131 (Everett L. Worthington, Jr. ed., 1998) [hereinafter DIMENSIONS OF
FORGIVENESS] (outlining the range of measures that predict reconciliation).
38. Roy F. Baumeister, Julie J. Exline, & Kristin L. Sommer, The Victim Role, Grudge Theory,
and Two Dimensions of Forgiveness,in DIMENSIONS OF FORGIVENESS, supranote 37, at 79, 85-86.
39. Robert D. Enright & Catherine T. Coyle, Researching the Process Model of Forgiveness
Within Psychological Interventions, in DIMENSIONS OF FORGIVENESS, supra note 37, at 139, 140.
Forgiveness does not necessarily imply a release from liability or responsibility to repair or
compensate for the harm. It should be distinguished from pardoning, in which the offender is
released from the legal penalties, condoning, in which the injured person justifies the offense,
excusing, in which the injured believes the offender's actions are defensible, and forgetting and
denial. Id. at 141.
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apologies-those likely to elicit forgiveness and reconciliation. Although
they vary slightly in expression, apology theorists have identified four
basic elements contained in an effective or "full" apologyidentification of the wrongful act, remorse, promise to forbear, and offer
to repair.4°
First, the transgressor must identify her wrongful act. She must
articulate, with specificity, the deed that has caused harm. Vague
reference to possible wrongdoing simply won't do, a point illustrated by
two historically prominent but ineffective public apology attempts. First,
in his resignation speech, President Nixon stated, "I regret deeply any
injuries that may have been done in the course of events that led to this
decision. ' Later, Senator Bob Packwood faced accusations that he had
sexually harassed several women while serving in Congress. Failing to
learn from Nixon's mistake, he responded with "I'm apologizing for the

40. Although we see four essential components to apology, several commentators have identified
more or fewer than four elements. See, e.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC:
MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 113 (1971) (asserting that an apology must contain the
following elements: 1) an expression of remorse and regret, 2) a manifestation of guilt for having
transgressed socially proscribed conduct, 3) sympathy with the application of and approving
sanction, 4) repudiation of the bad behavior and defamation of the self that so behaved, 5) espousal
of the correct behavior and "an avowal henceforth to pursue that course," and 6) "performance of
penance" and an offer of restitution). Tavuchis finds two fundamental requirements, "the offender
has to be sorry and has to say so." TAVUCHIS, supranote 16, at 36. He believes that other features,
such as "offers of reparation, self-castigation, shame, embarrassment, or promises to reform," are
implicit in the state of "being sorry." Id. Cohen identifies three elements: admitting fault, expressing
regret to the act, and expressing sympathy for the harm caused. Advising Clients, supra note 7, at
1014-15. Taft distinguishes an "authentic" apology as having two key elements-an unequivocal
expression of sorrow and an admission of wrongdoing. Taft, supra note 18, at 1154. Levi uses the
term "happy-ending apology" and asserts that it requires responsibility and regret for a harmful act.
Levi, supranote 10, at 1174-75. Relying on similar criteria in Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 16,
at 469-70, Orenstein asserts that "[a]t their fullest, apologies should: (1)acknowledge the legitimacy
of the grievance and express respect for the violated rule or moral norm; (2) indicate with specificity
the nature of the violation; (3) demonstrate understanding of the harm done; (4) admit fault and
responsibility for the violation; (5) express genuine regret and remorse for the injury; (6) express
concern for future good relations; (7) give appropriate assurance that the act will not happen again;
and, if possible, (8) compensate the injured party." Orenstein, supranote 17, at 239. An apology that
contains all essential elements might be referred to as a "full" apology. Although we assert that in
general a full apology is a necessary prerequisite to forgiveness and reconciliation, in practice there
are exceptions. In some cases, a full apology may not necessarily achieve reconciliation, while a
partial apology in another instance may.
Our use of the term "effective" apology simply assumes that the ultimate goal of apology,
reconciliation, is more likely to be achieved with an apology that contains most if not all of the
elements, implicitly or explicitly. Some commentators use the term "authentic" or "full" apologies.
41. THEODORE H. WHITE, BREACH OF FAITH: THE FALL OF RICHARD NIXON 350 (1975).
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conduct that it was alleged that I did."42 In both instances, the speaker's
words seemed qualified and defensive, as though he was afraid to make
himself vulnerable to his audience for his wrongdoing. But the very
essence of genuine, effective apology is the recognition of the fact that a
wrong makes the transgressor vulnerable, at least socially, to the victim
who holds the moral high ground.43 Failure to convey vulnerability
eviscerates the would-be apology. At the same time, however, the
conveyance of vulnerability can leave some transgressors extremely
reluctant to apologize."
45
Second, the transgressor must express remorse for her wrongful act.
The apologizer regrets both the transgression and the harm to the
relationship that has been caused.46 Remorse and its accompanying
42. Aaron Lazare, Go Ahead, Say You're Sorry, 28 PSYCHOL. TODAY 40, 76 (Jan/Feb 1995). The
ineffectiveness of these apologies is frequently discussed in the apology literature. See, e.g., Latif,
supra note 21, at 307-08; Taft, supra note 18, at 1141; TAVuCHIS, supranote 16, at 55-57.
43. "[Apologies] constitute-in their most responsible, authentic, and, hence, vulnerable
expression-a form of self-punishment that cuts deeply because we are obliged to retell, relive, and
seek forgiveness for sorrowful events that have rendered our claims to membership in a moral
community suspect or defeasible." TAvUCHIS, supra note 16, at 8; see also JEFFRIE G. MURPHY &
JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 28 (1988) ("[Olur moral relations provide for a ritual
whereby the wrongdoer can symbolically bring himself low (or raise us up ... )-in other words, the
humbling ritual of apology, the language of which is often that of begging for forgiveness.")
(emphases in original). We place power in the hands of the victim to determine whether forgiveness
and reacceptance is appropriate. See JORAm GRAF HABER, FORGIVENESS 102 (1991) (noting that
"forgiveness is at the victim's discretion"); TAVUCHIS, supra note 16, at 18 (apology is "about a fall
from social grace related to someone-the only one-who has the power to restore the offender to
that state") (emphasis in original).
44. See Taft, supra note 18, at 1142 (noting difficulty of offering apology); Orenstein, supranote
17, at 245-46; Lazare, supra note 42, at 78; see infra note 99 (discussing shame, humiliation,
vulnerability and powerlessness associated with apologizing).
45. Standard dictionary definitions of apology typically include an expression of regret. See, eg.,
WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1961) (apology defined as "... an admission to
another of a wrong or discourtesy done him accompanied by an expression of regret"); OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) (apology defined as "[a]n explanation offered to a person
affected by one's action that no offence was intended, coupled with the expression of regret for any
that may have been given; or, a frank acknowledgement of the offence with expression of regret for
it, by way of reparation"). See also Deborah Tannen, I'm Sorry, I Won't Apologize, N.Y. TIMES
MAGAZINE, July 21, 1996, at 34-35 ("[Y]our face should look dejected, your voice should sound
apologetic ... the depth of remorse should be commensurate with the significance of the offense.");
Advising Clients, supranote 7, at 1014-15 (listing the expression of regret as an essential element of
apology).
46. TAVUCHIS, supra note 16, at 20.
[T]he expression of regret (and hence, sorrow) that is essential to an apology speaks to the
offended other(s) of a shared loss resulting from one's unreasonable action. It refers to
something done (or not done), said (or unsaid), that betrays, and threatens whatever defines,
binds, and is deemed worthy. Reason points outward; apologies direct attention inward. Regret,
gently but firmly, reminds us of what we were before we erred, what our place was, where we
stood in relation to the other, and what we have lost. And regret is sad about this state because it
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sorrow are often conveyed with body language and facial expression in
face-to-face apologies. More distant apologies often require explicit, and
perhaps more extreme, statements of sorrow and regret.47 Without
remorse, there is no apology, as in the example of Reverend Jerry
Falwell's response to criticism of his assertion that the Antichrist was
alive and was a Jewish man. In his subsequent apology he expressed no
remorse. In fact, he said "I apologize not for what I believe," and
apologized instead for his lack of "tact" and "judgment" in making the
statement.
Third, the apology must include a promise of forbearance. 49 In essence
the apologist attempts to separate himself from his transgression, and to
move forward without moral stain. The transgressor acknowledges that
he has done something bad, but with the apology says that he is not a bad
person. This signal serves a useful purpose. The apologist often seeks to
continue his relationship with the victim, and uses the apology in an
attempt to bond himself to better behavior in the future. Even total
strangers share at least a temporary relationship by virtue of the fact of
the injury, and apology can help pave the way for constructive
discussions about reparations. 0 To continue the relationship beyond the
resolution of this transgression, the apologist's promise of forbearance
was me, my actions and conduct, and not those of someone else, or conditions beyond my
control, that brought about my estrangement. In other words, it was my poverty, my breach of
trust, that led to the loss.
Id. (empahsis in the original); see also Latif, supra note 19, at 306 ("[a]n expression of guilt
communicates that the offender is distressed over hurting the victim, that the potential loss of the
relationship matters to the offender, and that the offender is disappointed with himself over the
incident").
47. TAVUCHIS, supranote 16, at 27, provides an example of an effective apologetic letter:
Dear Hank:
There is no way I can erase the tragic error of my bumbling tongue this morning. I never would
consciously offend you in any way, because I respect and treasure your friendship. I hope that
along with all the other good qualities you possess, forgiveness is among them. For I need your
forgiveness now very much.
Sincerely,
Elizabeth
Id. The letter was originally printed in AMY VANDERBILT, THE AMY VANDERBILT COMPLETE BOOK
OF ETIQUETTE: A GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY LIVING 477 (1952) (Revised and expanded by Letita
Baldridge, 1978).
48. See FalwellApologizesforAntichrist Remarks, MARANATHA CHRISTIAN J., Feb. 10, 1999, at
http:/ww^v.mcjonline.com/news/news3030.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
49. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supranote 16, at 469-70 (stating that "meaningful apology" requires,
inter alia, promise that harmful act will not recur).
50. See Advising Clients, supranote 7, at 1020.
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might well require credibility; however, mere reconciliation presumably
requires no more than the perception that the transgressor sincerely
wishes to forbear. Of course, it is also possible for an apology to increase
the likelihood that the transgressor will reform her behavior. In other
words, an apology can serve to remind the transgressor of the value of
the relationship to her. It can have a transformative effect on the
transgressor's future behavior.
Identification of the wrongful act, remorse, and promise to forbear are
elements that confirm the validity of a norm shared by the victim and
transgressor. Through a clear expression of these elements, the
transgressor displays recognition of the norm violated and acceptance of
the mutuality of that norm. In fact, community leaders or norm
entrepreneurs might use apology as a mechanism for establishing new
social norms. Eventually, those new social norms may be expressed in
substantive law. Conversely, if interacting parties have failed to establish
shared social norms prior to an alleged transgression, the apology can be
delayed pending discussion of appropriate standards of conduct.
Finally, when the transgressor is guilty of wrongdoing, then his
effective apology requires an offer of repair," even though forgiveness
often results in the victim bearing some or all of the costs of the harms. 2
The overzealous little league ball player must offer to pay for a broken
window, and the negligent doctor must offer to perform remedial
procedures. Indeed, when direct compensation seems inappropriate or
infeasible, many transgressors make costly gestures designed to offset
the moral wrong. The man who breaks a date sends flowers, while the
unfairly accusatory wife cooks an elaborate meal. The transgressor may
express her willingness and, perhaps necessity, of offsetting the costs
imposed on a victim through self-mutilation and even suicide attempts.53
51. Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 16, at 469-70 ("meaningful apology" requires, inter alia,
willingness to compensate injured victim).
52. See supranote 39 (forgiveness need not pardon one from legal penalties).
53. See Leo Katz, Why the Successful Assassin Is More Wicked Than the Unsuccessful One, 88
CAL. L. REv. 791, 796 (2000) (using example of wrongdoer who feels so much remorse he engages
in self-mutilation). Examples of the symbolic use of self-mutilation and suicide abound in literature.
In the Greek myth of Oedipus, as told by Sophocles, the Second Messenger recounts how Oedipus
blinds himself upon the realization that the murderous and incestuous prophecy has played out:
He with them struck the pupils of his eyes,
Such words as these exclaiming: "They should see
No more the ills he suffered or had done;
But in the dark should look, in time to come,
On those they ought not, not know whom they would."
With such like wails, not once or twice alone,
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A consistent strand running through these elements is that the offender
accepts blame for the wrongful act and thus bears responsibility for
future forbearance and reparations. The more unambiguously and
emphatically a transgressor accepts blameworthiness, the more likely the
apology will induce meaningful reconciliation. For example, a clear
expression of responsibility ("I'm sorry I did x") is more effective than
one that deflects or avoids ("I'm sorry about x"). The latter could be
interpreted as merely an expression of sympathy rather than an apology.
Implicit in this discussion of apology is some sense of what effective
apologies are not. A communication between parties may sound like an
apology, but be missing a key element. Consider, for example, the recent
Sino-American row over the collision of a Chinese jet and U.S. spy plane
flying in airspace the Chinese seek to restrict.5 4 The Chinese jet crashed,
killing its pilot. Out of necessity, the U.S. plane landed on Chinese
territory, Hainan Island, without permission from the Chinese
government."5 The Chinese government detained the plane's crew of
twenty-four Americans for eleven days and demanded an apology from

Raising the lids, he tore his eyes, and they,
All bleeding, stained his cheek, nor ceased to pour
Thick clots of gore, but still the purple shower
Fell fast and full, a very rain of blood.
Such were the ills that fell on both of them,
Not on one only, wife and husband both.
His former fortune, which he held of old,
Was rightly honored; but for this day's doom
Wailing and woe, and death and shame, all forms
That man can name of evil, none have failed.
SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS THE KING, lines 1323-38 (E.H. Plumptre trans., The Harvard Classics, Vol.
VIII, Part 5, P.F. Collier & Son, 1909-14); available at http:lwww.bartleby.com/8/5/3.html (last
visited Oct. 15,2002). Consider also the following biblical example:
Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not commit adultery: But I say
unto you, That whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with
her already in his heart. And if thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee; for it
is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should
be cast into hell. And if thy right hand offend thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee: for it is
profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be
cast into hell.
Mathew 5:27-30 (King James). Shakespeare has called on the sentiment as well. Recall that Othello
kills himself after realizing lago has falsely enraged his jealousy with adulterous lies and tricked him
into killing his beloved and innocent wife. His last words: "I kiss'd thee ere I kill'd thee; no way but
this, Killing myself to die upon a kiss." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 5, sc. 2, line 415 (The
Oxford Shakespeare: The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, Oxford University Press, Craig,
W.J. ed., 1914), available at www.bartleby.com70/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2002).
54. See Mitch Frank Bush 's Big Test, TIME, Apr. 16,2001, at 26.
55. Id.
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Washington. After a number of attempts at framing a mutuallyacceptable statement,56 the standoff eventually ended with a letter stating
that the U.S. was "very sorry" for the loss of the Chinese pilot and for
landing in Hainan without permission. 7 The letter did not apologize for
flying in that airspace or for the plane's defending itself from the pursuit
of the Chinese jet."5 In the end, then, the Americans took no
responsibility for the incident, and they still got their crew back.
The U.S. statement was not an apology as we define it because it
purposely avoided any recognition of a wrongful act other than landing
in Chinese territory without permission-an easily accepted mutual
norm. The statement failed to address the fundamental source of the
conflict. Furthermore, the statement was rhetorical and strategic. 9
Formal recognition of the communication as an apology served each
party's goals of deescalating the immediate hostilities while saving face
with their respective citizenry and posturing for future negotiations over
U.S. flights near Chinese territory. Like so many "public apologies"
issued by officials with political agendas, the U.S. statement was much
too guarded and too focused on short-term considerations to be
considered "effective" in any fundamental sense.
In addition to incomplete apologies and strategic apologies, apologies
masquerading as argument are likely to prove ineffective. Argumentative
apologies typically begin with, "I'm sorry, but..." statements. The
speaker starts her sentence with conciliation, in the hopes of softening
her opponent, and ends the sentence with accusation. "I'm sorry" here is
intended to convey reasonableness and to usurp the moral high ground
rather than to express remorse.6 ° Similarly, "I'm sorry, but. .."
56. Initially, Secretary of State Colin Powell expressed "regret" over the fate of the Chinese pilot,
and President Bush followed up with a similar statement of regret. But the Chinese government
found these statements unsatisfactory. The Chinese recognize four distinct levels of apology: yihan
and wan xi, meaning roughly "excuse me" or a mild "I'm sorry";feichangbao qian, approximating
"very sorry"; dao qian, implying significant responsibility (what the Chinese initially demanded)
and which in diplomatic terms suggests a degree of submission. This third level of apology is rarely
given and is apparently never offered by a person in power. The very highest level is called xie zui,
the forgiveness asked by a criminal in capital crime cases. Robert Marquand, U.S. "Sorry'Heardin
Beifing as an Apology, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR, April 12,2001, at 1.
57. Peter Wonacott, China Set to Release Crew of Downed U.S. Spy Plane, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 12, 2001, at 2.
58. Id.
59. Deborah Levi labels this type of apology a "tactical apology." Levi, supra note 10, at 117273. It might also be labeled a "formalistic apology" in which the words are said but there is no
remorse. Levi, supra note 10, at 1174.
60. Levi equates such an apology with Pmitt's "attitudinal structuring tactic" in bargaining
behavior. Levi, supra note 10, at 1174 (citing DEAN G. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 80
(1981)).
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sometimes prefaces an excuse or explanation. The speaker typically
finishes off this sentence by presenting facts calculated to convince the
victim that his act was not really wrongful, or that an apology is not
ultimately necessary. An example would be President Clinton's apology
for his conduct when he stated that although "deeply regret[ting]" his
actions, Ken Starr was out of control and that "[e]ven Presidents have
private lives."6 Explanations and excuses may, at times, help to foster
reconciliation because they may convince the victim of some mitigating
circumstance thereby altering the perceived intent of the transgression.
However, they can backfire by fostering further resentment by the
victim. Although some potential exists for fostering reconciliations, "I
am sorry, but" statements lack the requisite defenselessness to be
considered apologies in the sense discussed in this Article.
B.

The Nuances OfApology

Apology is a nuanced phenomenon. Word choice matters a lot, as
evidenced by the Sino-American spy plane exchange. Context is also
extremely important. Sometimes, an abbreviated expression of apology
can carry wvith it the implied presence of unspoken elements but other
times it cannot. At times a written apology is effective, but often face-toface communications are necessary.62 Some offenses are so small they do
not require apology. Others are so big that apology (or certainly
forgiveness) is not possible. The timing of an apology seems to matter
as well, in a way that depends on the severity of the transgression.' For
small offenses, effective apologies need to occur right away, but for
some larger offenses, delay can be more effective." In these latter
situations, immediate apologies may not imply sufficient remorse and
suffering.6 Whether an apology must be elaborate in order to be
effective may vary with the severity of the harm or the degree to which
61.
1998,
62.
63.

William J. Clinton, Speech to the American Republic RegardingMonica Lewinsky, Aug. 17,
available at vwvw.zpub.com/un/un-bc-spl.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2002).
See TAVUCHIS, supranote 16, at 26-27 (comparing oral and written apologies).
See id. 25 (some injuries too offensive for apology).

64. See id. at 87-90.
65. See id. at 23; Bolstad, supra note 16, at 549 ("[A]n apology offered too quickly or too glibly
may be dismissed as inauthentic.').
66. The gravity of the offense may turn at least as much on the mens rea, or state of mind of the
transgressor than it does the magnitude of harm. One who harms intentionally or knowingly may
need to delay an apology longer than one who harms merely negligently. On the other hand, if one is
hoping to convey to a victim that his harm was a mere accident, an early apology might be more
effective. The effectiveness of the delay here likely turns on the victim's prior beliefs about the
transgressor's state of mind.
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the offender is culpable for the harm. 67 The victim's perceptions of the
character of the act and the offender's intentions and prior reputation are
additional contextual factors that determine whether an apology will be
accepted.68
Nuances and the expression and interpretation of apologetic discourse
may vary with culture, but regardless of cultural differences, the victim
typically pays careful attention to nonverbal cues. Consciously or
unconsciously, victims pay attention to just about everything: eye
contact, breath, body posture, facial expressions, tone of voice, pace of
speech, and even order of words.69 All available information about the
transgressor's apology can go into an interpretation of its sincerity. 70 But
why? Why should it matter to the victim whether the apology is sincere?
Or, to phrase the question slightly differently, why isn't it always
sufficient for the transgressor to admit that he committed a wrong? The
next section explores current theories' answers to this question. It
concludes that none are sufficiently explanatory, and offers an alternative
analysis that incorporates tools from both biology and economics.
II.

THE ROOTS OF CONCILIATORY DESIRES

In Part A of this section, we discuss others' accounts of the role or
importance of apology and conclude that each treatment, although
67. One study showed that more elaborate apologies were offered when offenders had a high
degree of responsibility or when consequences were severe. The type of apology offered (elaborate
v. perfunctory) is determined by "magnitude" of event, which itself is determined by the two factors
of responsibility and severity. Barry R. Schlenker & Bruce W. Darby, The Use of Apologies in
Social Predicaments, 44 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 271, 275-76 (1981). Other researchers attempted to
ascertain the factors that will determine whether an apology is rejected by varying the offender's
responsibility for the event and, independently, the severity of the event. Although they found strong
correlations between responsibility and severity, they were struck by the fact that degree of
responsibility had little influence over anger dissipation but degree of severity did. Thus, if the event
was not serious, anger was more likely to dissipate quickly. Mark Bennett & Deborah Earwaker,
Victims 'Responses to Apologies: The Effects of Offender Responsibilityand Offense Severity, 134 J.
SOC. PSYCHOL. 457, 458 (1994).
68. Children's Reactions to Trangressions,supra note 34, at 353-55 (stating that the mitigating
effect of apologies is determined on the basis of the remorse that observers perceive, and there is a
close correlation between perception of remorse and acceptance of apology (forgiveness) regardless
of the intentionality of harm).
69. See ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS
126 (1988) (discussing interpretational clues to sincerity); Robert N. Strassfeld, Robert McNamara
and the Art and Law of Confession: "A Simple Desultory Philippic (or How I was Roberta
McNamara'dInto Submission)", 47 DuKE L.J. 491, 516 (1997) (noting that judges rely on defendant
demeanor to assess sincerity of remorse).
70. Advising Clients, supra note 7, at 1064, 1066 (noting that recipient of apology can judge its
sincerity and feigning sincerity is difficult for many offenders).
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offering valuable descriptions of some aspect of apology, is lacking an
ultimate explanation of the phenomenon. That is, no prior apology
scholar has adequately explained why we care about apology and
forgiveness. Only by understanding why we care can we fully appreciate
how apology and forgiveness can be manipulated, or abused. In Part B
we offer an evolutionary economic theory of apology.
A.

Current Theories On The Use And Effectiveness OfApology

To determine why victims might care whether apologies are sincere,
we must return to the powerful emotions bound up in apology and
forgiveness. Why do people often feel motivated to apologize when they
do wrong? Why do some victims seek revenge and vindication when no
apology comes forth, while others may forgive without receiving an
adequate apology? How does the receipt of a sincere apology have the
potential to transform a terrible moral wrong into a mere misfortune of
life in the eyes of the victim? Why does a formerly vindictive person
forgo both vengeful behavior and demands for compensation when an
apology is received? The emotions for apology and forgiveness can be
compelling, but can they be explained?
A number of social psychologists purport to explain the emotions
behind making an apology. Several social psychologists focus on
transgressors' attempts to ameliorate the negative image of themselves
that others may adopt after a transgression. Under impression
management concepts,7 ' for example, people attempt to control the image
that others have of them in social interactions. Apology is one of several
types of remedial actions "designed to convince the audience that an
undesirable event should not be considered a fair representation of what
the actor is 'really like' as a person." ' Similarly, under attribution theory
and the attributional model of emotion and motivation,73 people react to
causal attributions. Apology reduces or prevents the attribution of
negative identity by leading others to perceive the transgression as less
under the control of the transgressor. If the transgressor is determined to
be less responsible for the transgression, his social identity is restored
71. See generally BARRY R. SCHLENKER, IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT: THE SELF-CONCEPT,
SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS (1980).

72. Id. at 154. Goffman takes a similar approach by describing apology as a remedial interchange
which "[splits] the self into a blameworthy part and apart that stands back and sympathizes with the
blame giving, and, by implication, is worthy of being brought back into the fold." GOFFMAN, supra
note 40, at 113.
73. See generally BERNARD WEINER, AN ATTRIBUTIONAL THEORY OF MOTIVATION AND
EMOTION (1986).
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and forgiveness becomes more likely.74 Under the correspondent
inference theory, people make inferences about individuals based on
their actions.75 A negative act infers a negative personality trait and vice
versa. Apology breaks the link between the negative act and the
perception that the transgressor intended to produce that act. It thereby
reduces the perception of negative attributes and facilitates forgiveness.'
Communication theorists provide a similar framework in which parties
engage in apologetic discourse for purposes of image restoration.77
Each of these accounts of apology is woefully incomplete. The
accounts are useful because 1) they hint at why transgressors may wish
to apologize, and 2) each of them focuses on the admittedly important
role that reputation plays in interpersonal relations and the fact that
apologies can help restore transgressors' reputations. However, their
exclusive focus on transgressors limits their usefulness because they fail
to account for victims' desire for apology. According to the impression
management, attribution, correspondent, inference, and communication
theories of apology, victims should be at best indifferent to, and possibly
hostile to, transgressors' apologies. And yet, quite the opposite seems to
be true. Moreover, the accounts may not qualify as "theories" at all.7"
Like so much of psychology, this literature attempts to classify behavior
and describe effective strategies. Unfortunately, very little by way of
explanation or prediction is provided.
By contrast, other social psychologists offer politeness theory,79 which
attempts to explain why victims desire apology from transgressors.
Under this account, transgressions harm the social identity of the victim,
by, for example, giving the impression that the victim can be taken
advantage of. 0 Apology helps restore the victim's social identity.8"
Politeness theory helps to underscore the fact that victims' reputations
74. Seiji Takaku, The Effects of Apology and PerspectiveTaking on InterpersonalForgiveness:A
Dissonance-AttributionModel ofInterpersonalForgiveness, 141 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 494,495 (2001).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. A good summary of the communication theorists' perspective can be found in WILLIAM L.
BENOIT, ACCOUNTS, EXCUSES, AND APOLOGIES: A THEORY OF IMAGE RESTORATION STRATEGIES

(1995).
78. See SCHLENKER, supra note 71, at v (admitting that "no definitive theory of impression
management has yet been achieved").
79. See BROWN & LEVINSON, supranote 29.
80. The transgression actually reflects negatively on social perceptions of the victim. Other
members of society perceive the victim as an "easy mark" so to speak or that the victim in some way
"asked for it."
81. See generally Ken-Ichi Ohbuchi et al., Apology as Aggression Control: Its Role in Mediating
Appraisalof andResponse to Harm, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 219 (1989).
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are affected by both transgressions and apologies. Unfortunately, its
single-minded focus on victims limits its usefulness because it fails to
account for transgressors' desire to apologize. Any useful "theory" of
apology must explain its usefulness to both transgressors and victims.
Some researchers have hypothesized that the emotions behind apology
and forgiveness can be explained by equity theory. 2 Equity theory posits
that individuals attempt to maintain a balance between inputs and outputs
in relationships and experience anxiety when the social exchange
becomes inequitable. If not in response to a perceived inequity, a
transgression can induce anxiety in the transgressor, and any seemingly
unprovoked harm causes anxiety in the victim. The inequity can be
redressed either by the victim harming the transgressor or by the
transgressor compensating the victim. Applying equity theory, apology is
a partial compensation reducing the disequilibrium favoring the
transgressor. This relief of disequilibrium reduces the anxiety suffered by
both parties. Forgiveness also enables the victim to reach emotional
equilibrium. Curiously, when the victim responds by forgiving, it
actually increases the social debt or the equity anxiety that can result in
higher motivation for the transgressor to compensate.3 Thus, under
equity theory, apology decreases the amount of compensation required
by the victim to resolve the dispute with the transgressor. In other words,
forgiveness tends to increase the value of compensation offered by the
transgressor.
One important implication of equity theory is that both apology and
forgiveness are valued components of dispute resolution that can be
traded off against other valued components of dispute resolution.
Moreover, these components, apology, forgiveness and compensation,
are endogenously related to one another. Put differently, the dollar
amounts that victims demand and transgressors are willing to pay to
settle disputes will turn on the existence of apology and forgiveness
during the course of their communications with one another and with
others. In this sense, equity theory is remarkably similar to an exchange
model wherein an apology is depicted as an "implicitly bargained-for
exchange" in which the object of the exchange is the apology.' As an
exchangeable good, the apology has some value that is exchanged for
something that the victim gives up. For example, the victim may reduce
82. See generally Brad RC. Kelln & John H. Ellard, An Equity Theory Analysis of the Impact of
Forgiveness and Retribution on Transgressor Compliance, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 864 (1999).
83. Id. at 864-65.
84. Levi, supranote 10, at 1175-77.
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his demand for monetary compensation, settle a lawsuit or cease
withholding some benefit to the offender.
Recent apology scholars have rejected the exchange model as being
overly quantitative and insensitive to the qualitative factors that help
explain why apology fails." Levi, for example, favors a ritual model,
drawn largely from Tavuchis' work, in which apology is "a corrective
ritual performed by two subjects in order to redress a moral power
imbalance between them."86 Under this approach, the transgressor must
cede the moral high ground to the victim and accomplishes this through
apology. Similarly, Taft rejects the commodification of apology,
preferring a model involving moral balance." The ritual model of
apology describes the role of moral imbalance in apology, and Taft is
surely correct that eliminating this imbalance is a large part of the value
of apology. Unfortunately, the ritual model, while descriptively useful, is
essentially useless as a predictive matter. Apology can serve to identify
and correct an imbalance, but which imbalances will be corrected, and
why? The moral balance description is too subjective to be useful.
Moreover, this categorical resistance to consequentialist analyses
leaves the concept of apology without rigor. Although placing actual
dollar values on apology may seem offensive, the fact is that apologies
settle disputes with actual dollar consequences. If victims entertain the
tradeoff between apology and monetary compensation, perhaps a model
of apology should too. Much more importantly, however, it is possible to
construct an exchange model without ignoring important qualitative
factors involved in apology. Our position is that dollars are not
everything, and law and economic models of suit and settlement need to
take into account other important systematically ignored factors. At the
same time, any model of human behavior must recognize that actions
involve tradeoffs among a whole host of considerations-emotional,
reputational, monetary, and otherwise. It simply ignores reality to
dismiss attempts at rigorous analysis as "commodification" or
"insensitivity."
The social psychologists, put together, do a better job than do the
moral balance analysts of explaining why victims and transgressor might
85. Id. at 1177. Although Cohen refers to apology and forgiveness in economic terms as
"commodities" in a monopolistic market (the apology is only available from the offender and vice
versa), he notes the tendency in economic analysis, including settlement analysis, of downplaying
non-physical aspects of consumption or non-pecuniary elements such as apology. Advising Clients,
supranote 7, at 1016-17 n.24.
86. Levi, supra note 10, at 1177.
87. See Taft, supranote 18, at 1154-57.
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value apology. However, most social psychologists focus on the effect of
apology on the impression of third parties. Although we think third-party
impressions can contribute to apology and forgiveness in important
ways, no "theory" of apology is satisfactory if it cannot also explain why
so many people desire apologies even when the transgression or the
expressions of remorse or forgiveness are not shared publicly. Moreover,
most of this literature is primarily descriptive, begging the question of
what is the ultimate cause' for the physiologically-triggered emotions
involved. A deeper explanation for apologetic behavior and its
concomitant emotions is needed.
Finally, Orenstein focuses on the quite fascinating questions of
whether and why women are more willing to apologize than are men."
As Orenstein points out, there is significant anecdotal evidence and some
empirical data that women are in fact more likely to apologize than
men.9" For example, Deborah Tannen, who has studied communication
in the workplace, observed that women tend to use apology more often
as a device to smooth over interpersonal difficulties.91 However, others
have not found any sex differences in willingness to apologize.92
Apparently, there exists no evidence at all on whether men or women
more readily apologize for more severe offenses.93 Regarding less severe
transgressions, there is some evidence that sex differences in apologetic
behavior depend on context. For example, men are more likely to
apologize for intrusions on time, whereas women are more likely to
apologize for intrusions on physical space.94 Clearly more work needs to
be done before we can reliably conclude that men and women
significantly differ in their apologetic behavior. If sex differences
ultimately do matter for apology and forgiveness, we need an
explanation for these differences. Culture may play an important role in
88. See infra note 103 and accompanying text fora discussion of the importance of distinguishing
proximate and ultimate causes of human behavior.
89. See Orenstein, supra note 17.
90. Id. at 250.
91. Tannen, supra note 45, at 34; see also Janet Holmes, Sex Differences and Apologies: One
Aspect of Communicative Competence, 10 APPLIED LINGUISTICS 194, 197 (1989); Amy Ash Nixon
& Fran Silverman, Sorry Situation: There's A Gender Gap When it Comes to Apologies, SEATTLE
TIMES, Mar. 30, 1997, at M6 (quoting DEBORAH TANNEN, TALKING FROM 9 TO 5 (1994)).
92. See Bruce Fraser, On Apologizing, in CONVERSATIONAL ROUTINE: EXPLORATIONS IN
STANDARDIZED COMMUNICATION SITUATIONS AND PREPATTERNED SPEECH 259, 269 (Flourian

Coulmas ed., 1981); Levi, supranote 10, at 1184-85.
93. See Orenstein, supra note 17, at 252.
94. Judith Mattson Bean & Barbara Johnstone, Workplace Reasons for Saying You're Sorry:
Discourse Task Management and Apology, 17 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 59, 79 (Roy 0. Freedle ed.,
1994).
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the explanation; however, indications are that apologetic and remedial
behavior, although variable in their specifics, are found in most if not all
cultures.95 If so, biology might matter for apology. Biology might also
help to explain any systematic sex differences in apologetic behavior.9 6
Consequently, we turn now to the role of apology in evolution.
B.

An Evolutionary Economic Explanationfor Apology

The tastes for apology and forgiveness are sufficiently common that
we might say they are?' "two quintessentially human (and in fact highly
valued) traits." 98 Despite their emotional complexity,9 9 we believe that
evolutionary biology can help us understand why they are valued. 00 Put
differently, an evolutionary treatment of apology compliments the
usefulness of previous analyses of the topic while simultaneously
transcending the bounds of social psychology, of the constrained
perspective of feminist and cultural analyses, and of the
nonconsequentialism of moralistic, normative treatments.
This Part B begins with a brief introduction of the concepts in
evolutionary biology that are relevant to some of the human behaviors
and emotions that law addresses. It describes the role of cooperation, (or
reciprocal altruism), cheater tendencies, moralistic aggression (or spite),
punishment, and deception in evolutionary theory generally and
describes how tastes for apology and forgiveness could be evolutionarily

95. See supra note 29 for a discussion of the cross-cultural evidence.
96. In the environment in which humans evolved, men and women apparently formed coalitions
with differing frequency for differing purposes. Men needed to cooperate when hunting was
necessary, whereas, women formed close social bonds to assist in the rearing of offspring. If women
in fact relied more on social bonds, then we might expect them to engage in the relationshippreserving behavior of apology more often. And, if women valued reliability more than men, they
could be expected to be less forgiving. Moreover, if relationships and reliability were more valued in
differing contexts for men and women we might expect them to rely on apologetic behavior
differently. We offer this supposition to draw a possible link between evolution and sex differences
with regard to apology.
97. See supra note 29 for a discussion of the cross-cultural evidence.
98. Orenstein, supra note 17, at 242 (parenthetical in original).
99. The emotional aspects of apology are not as simple as our textual discussion to this point may
appear to suggest. Apologies can be warm, fuzzy and cathartic, but they can also involve shame,
humiliation, and a sense of vulnerability and powerlessness. Moreover, an otherwise self-righteous
victim can experience guilt if he angrily rejects a sincere apology. The intensity of these emotions
can vary across situations and individuals, and there may also be important sex differences in this
behavior and its accompanying emotions. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
100. Cf Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 32, at 1170 ("evolutionary theory can, in ways relevant to
law, both reveal and make sense of surprising patterns in human behavior").
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adaptive. This subpart then attempts to incorporate these evolutionary
concepts into an economic framework.
The evolutionary biology primarily, serves to help explain why
emotional commitments favoring apology and forgiveness could have
been adaptive in the environment in which our human brains evolved.
Moreover, by understanding why these commitment strategies likely
were adaptive in an earlier time, we can understand how, and why, these
commitments can be exploited today to serve potentially maladaptive
functions. More basically, evolutionary biology can help explain why
people often cooperate in non-repeat interactions, and why they often
apologize and forgive with no prospect of future interactions. For readers
who are prepared to accept the idea that, despite the Prisoner's Dilemma
models, people commit themselves to behave appropriately, the
evolutionary biology approach below may not be a necessary component
of the normative analysis that follows in Part III. However, rational actor
scholars will not easily accept the empirical assertion that many people
feel compelled to behave altruistically, or without clear calculation of
immediate costs and benefits. For this latter group we offer the following
ultimate explanation of such seemingly (though not ultimately) irrational
behavior.
1.
A.

An All Too Brief Overview ofLaw-Relevant EvolutionaryBiology
Reproductive Success and BehavioralCausation

According to behavioral biology, much of human and other animal
behavior can be better understood through an evolutionary lens." 1
Behavior depends on mechanisms that are both proximate and
ultimate.'t 2 "Proximate and ultimate causes operate together, with all
behavior depending on ultimately-shaped proximate mechanisms."'0 3

101. Much of the material presented in this section can be found in Owen Jones' excellent
summary. Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 32. One difficulty with the developing law and biology
scholarship is the need for each author to present a lengthy description of evolutionary theory as
background for the reader who may be uninitiated to the discipline. Our summary does little justice
to the theory of evolution, but rather than repeating all of what others have done so well previously,
we refer you to Professor Jones' article and his comprehensive list of citations. Id. at 1121 n.3. More
recently, Professor Jones has substantially updated that list and made it publicly available at
www.sealsite.org/readings.htm (last visited October 18, 2002).
102. These terms for causation are used differently in biology than in law. See generally Owen
Jones, Genes, Behavior,and Law, 15 POL. & LiFE SCi. 101 (1996).
103. Jones, ChildAbuse, supranote 32, at 1128. See generally John Alcock & Paul Sherman, The
Utility ofthe Proximate-UltimateDichotomy in Ethology, 96 ETHOLOGY 58 (1994).
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Biochemical and physiological changes combined with the individual's
developmental and environmental history proximately cause the
emotional state or feelings that shape behavior surrounding apology and
forgiveness. We look to evolutionary processes to explain what
ultimately caused such broadly observable behaviors in our species.
Ultimate causes are important because they can shed better light on what
motivates behavior than can a simple-minded focus on the proximate
emotional feelings alone. More importantly for our purposes, they can
help us to establish the existence and strength of the proximate emotions
that underlie behavior.
Evolutionary biologists begin with the assumption that the primary
objective of the gene is reproductivesuccess relative to others."4 Natural
selection acts to filter the less reproductively successful from the more
reproductively successful."'5 Intra-species variation of physical and
behavioral traits is either advantageous to reproductive success
(adaptive), disadvantageous (maladaptive), or neutral."0 6 Because it
increases an individual's reproductive success relative to others, the
incidence of an adaptive, inheritable trait can be expected to increase in
successive generations in a population.' 7 Conversely, maladaptive traits
should decrease in frequency over time."' Thus, natural selection helps
determine the observable proportions of particular traits, physical and
behavioral, in a given population."0 9 If an appreciable number of the
members of a species exhibit a certain behavioral trait, then a
predisposition to behave in that manner may have enhanced the
survivability of the individual's genes over time. In other words, it may
be said that the behavior is evolutionarily adaptive, part of an "evolved

104. See ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 21 (1985). To be more precise, transmission of
one's genes to future generations can be accomplished directly, by producing one's own offspring,
and indirectly, by maximizing the ability of relatives (who share genes) to produce offspring. Id. at
53-57. Technically, natural selection is assumed to favor those traits that maximize inclusive fitness,
or the reproductive success of self and genetically related others. Id. at 57.
105. Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 32, at 1135-36 ("[n]atural selection, like a giant colander
sorting small pebbles from large, sifts the less reproductively successful members of a species from
the more reproductively successful").
106. Id. at 1137 n.53.
107. Id.
108. Id.

109. Id.
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psychology"'' t that yielded more reproductive success than contrary
behaviors that are absent or less present in the population."'
According to evolutionary biologists, organisms use various
reproductivestrategies to pass on their genes and ensure the survival or
reproductive success of their offspring. Sexual and asexual reproduction
are examples of two different reproductive strategies." 2 Of course, in
sexual reproduction, a given set of genes is more likely to survive if the
organism can attract evolutionarily desirable mates (whose genes can
enhance the survival of one's own genes). For example, these sexual
selection pressures are believed to have caused the development of the
peacock's tail, which is beautiful but slows down the peacock." 3 Notice
that natural selection and sexual selection can work at cross purposes
with one another. Thus, the peacock's tail adds to the attractiveness but
not the survivability of the bird."' Some evolutionary psychologists
believe that sexual selection is responsible for much of the development
of art, music, and intellectual discourse over the last several centuries." 5
Indeed, our extraordinary mental capacities may be the human equivalent
of the peacock's tail.
Optimal reproductive strategies should be condition-dependent
resulting in physical attributes and behavioral predispositions that vary
110. Id. at 1139 (Natural selection "effectively creates evolved psychologies, to the extent that a
psychology is a short way of describing species-typical information processing pathways tending to
yield some behaviors, in given circumstances, more than others.").
111. Note that nothing in evolutionary theory suggests that all individuals must exhibit a
behavioral trait for that trait to be considered a heritable product of evolutionary forces. Indeed, the
prevalence of one trait in a portion of the population can make it adaptive for some subgroup of the
population to lack that trait. See infra notes 180-89 and accompanying text (discussing adaptiveness
of both predisposition to cooperate, and, assuming the presence of cooperators, predisposition to
defect).
112. Jones discusses the tradeoffbetween sexual and asexual reproductive strategies. Jones, Child
Abuse, supra note 32, at 1142-43. On the advantages of sexual reproduction, see generally MATT
RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN: SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE 55-87 (1994); William D.
Hamilton, Sex Versus Non-Sex Versus Parasite,35 OIKOS 282 (1980); R. Stephen Howard & Curtis
M. Lively, Parasitism, Mutation Accumulation and the Maintenance of Sex, 367 NATURE 554
(1994); Richard J. Ladle, Parasitesand Sex: Catchingthe Red Queen, 7 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY AND
EVOLUTION 405 (1992).
113. Jones, ChildAbuse,supranote 32, at 1144.
114. It may be that conspicuous displays (i.e., the peacock's tail) signal the survivability of the
individual, by conveying the idea that the individual is so strong that he/she is able to survive despite
the handicap. AMOTZ ZAHAVI & AVISHAG ZAHAVI, THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE: A MISSING PIECE OF

DARWIN'S PUZZLE 32-33 (1997). Quite aside from the sheer size of the peacock's tail, the color and
symmetry of the tail could be an advertisement for parasite resistance, a related but slightly different
phenomenon. Id.
115 See GEOFFREY MILLER, THE MATING MIND: How SEXUAL CHOICE SHAPED THE EVOLUTION

OF HUMAN NATURE (2000).
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with changing environmental conditions." 6 The female opossum
produces a disproportionate number of male babies when she is well-fed
because those males are more likely to enjoy greater reproductive
success than will her females and the male offspring of less well-fed
possums."' Also, humans from colder climates tend to weigh more and
have more body surface than those from warmer climates." 8 Because
behavioral plasticity can be adaptive, those with the cognitive capability
to finely distinguish environmental situations and respond appropriately
will gain an advantage relative to others. For example, we may be better
off if we behave differently in warmer climes than in colder areas.
Hostile environments should trigger reactions that are dormant in
friendly environments. And, we should behave differently among friends
than we do strangers. "[I]n species with advanced cognitive capacities,
behavioral plasticity is further increased by an ability to analyze a very
large number of variables, to assess probable outcomes as a consequence
of given behaviors, and to choose among them."" 9 For humans, then, we
can expect the cognitive capacities to diminish but not eclipse the
influence of condition-dependent predispositions. 2 °
B.

CooperationAs An Adaptive Strategy

Cooperation has been an area of focus for behavioral biologists in
recent decades.' One can easily understand the value of purely selfish
behaviors in enhancing the survivability of one's genes. Thus, intraspecies rivalries, competition, even rape and homicide, become
unsurprising from a biological perspective.' " Cooperation and altruism
among related individuals should also be an intuitively sensible strategy

116. Jones, ChildAbuse, supra note 32, at 1146.
117. Steven N. Austad & Mel E. Sunquist, More Sons for Plump Possums, NAT. HIST., Apr. 1988,
at 74,74-75.
118. TRIVERS, supranote 104, at 32-33.
119. Jones, ChildAbuse, supra note 32, at 1146.
120. Id.
121. Although there is considerable focus in biology on competition among species and
individuals, symbiosis, mutuality, and cooperation have received increasing attention, despite
common perceptions of evolutionary theory. "Survival of the fittest" did not originate with Darwin,
nor does it accurately describe the focus of his research.
122. Which may explain why behavioral biology under its alternative labels, sociobiology and
evolutionary psychology, was so scornfully rejected by many social scientists. See Joan Vogel,
Biological Theories of Human Behavior: Admonitions of a Skeptic, 22 VT. L REV. 425, 425 n.1
(1997) (warning against evil uses of biological theories and citing several books detailing the uses
and abuses of biological theories).
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from a biological perspective because it increases the survivability of
shared genes
To explain, we should expect that an individual would be willing to
act to the benefit of one's child if doing so increases the survivability of
that child by more than twice the degree to which it jeopardizes one's
own survivability. This is because, on average, the child shares half of its
genes with each of its parents.Ia Moreover, an individual should be twice
as likely to assist her own child as she is likely to assist her niece or
nephew, because the niece and nephew share a mere quarter of her genes
on average, as compared to one half for her child. And, in general, the
more closely related two individuals are, the more each is willing to
invest in the welfare of the other. 4
Trivers describes this phenomenon as it relates to warning calls in
Belding's ground squirrels.ls Some of these ground squirrels call out
when they see a predator approaching. The other squirrels are better able
to flee the predator with this warning, but the caller is more likely to be
killed because the caller has revealed her location. Careful study of these
ground squirrels showed that adult females frequently call out while
adult males rarely do. Kinship theory explains this distinction because
adult female ground squirrels are typically surrounded by their relatives
while adult males tend to travel alone. Indeed, the more relatives that an
adult female has nearby, the more likely she is to call. Moreover, these
females are much more likely to call if sisters, half-sisters or daughters
are nearby than they are if cousins, nieces or granddaughters are nearby.
Other species discriminate similarly in their altruistic behaviors. 6

123. TRIVERS, supranote 104, at 45.
124. For a terrific discussion of kinship and its effect on social organization, see TRIVERS, supra
note 104, at 109:
Just as natural selection favors traits that increase an individual's production of surviving
offspring, because parent and offspring are genetically related, so natural selection favors traits
that increase the survival of other categories of relatives, such as siblings and cousins. Since
aiding one kind of relative must usually conflict with aiding another, as when investment in
nephews and nieces decreases investment in offspring, we expect mechanisms of choice to
evolve that reflect differential degrees of relatedness. Each individual will seem to value the
reproductive success of others, compared to his own, according to the [degrees of relatedness]
that connect them.
125. Id. at 110-14. For the original literature on warning calls in ground squirrels, see generally
Paul NV. Sherman, Nepotism and the Evolution of Alarm Calls, 197 ScIENCE 1246 (1977);
Christopher Dunford, Kin Selection for GroundSquirrel Alarm Calls, 111 AMER. NAT. 782 (1977);
Daniel W. Leger & D. H. Owings, Responses to Alarm Calls by California Ground Squirrels:
Effects of CallStructure andMaternalStatus, 3 BEHAV. ECOL. & SOCIOBIOL. 177 (1978).
126. Jones, Child Abuse, supranote 32, at 1149-50.
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Cooperation and altruism 127 among unrelated individuals are also
common for humans and other animals. We help neighbors, fellow
church members, friends, even strangers, and with no expectation that we
share genes. The primate literature indicates that grooming and other
forms of assistance extend beyond kinship for some other animals as
well. What can explain non-kin cooperation and altruism? Each of these
forms of assistance confers benefits on the recipient at a cost to the actor.
Since natural selection operates at the level of the individual or gene
rather than the group, the existence and persistence of a trait that benefits
the group at the expense of the individual's reproductive success seem
counterintuitive. 128 Is there an explanation for this altruism that is
consistent with evolutionary theory, given that the two cooperating
individuals compete with one another for relative gene survival?
The precise answer to this question is still debated,2 2 but at least part
of this seemingly altruistic behavior is captured by the logic of reciprocal
altruism. 3 ' The idea is that some of what we label altruistic is really the
first step toward reaping the benefits of anticipated cooperation. A does
B a favor today in anticipation of being able to call on B tomorrow for a
return favor.' When B returns the favor, both A and B are made better
off relative to others competing for the survival of their genes. Under the
logic of reciprocal altruism, a cost to reproductive success today is a net
gain to reproductive
success tomorrow, providing B actually
32
reciprocates.
127. In the biological context, altruistic acts are those that increase the recipient's reproductive
success at the expense of the actor's. See TRIVERS, supranote 104, at 41-42.
128. See Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 32, at 1140 (citations omitted).
129. For a discussion of the current debate on individual versus group selection, see Todd
Zywicki, Was Hayek Right About Group Selection?, 13 REV. OF AUSTRIAN ECON. 81 (2000). For a
discussion of the earlier debate and an argument favoring the individual selection hypothesis, see
TRIVERS, supra note 104, at 67-85. For a treatment of the history of the debate, see Ernst Mayr,
Driving Forces in Evolution: An Analysis of Natural Selection, in THE EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY OF
VIRUSES 29 (Stephen S. Morse, ed., 1994).
130. Another explanation for favoring non-relatives with resources is mutualism, which occurs
under conditions where cooperation can yield a larger immediate payoff in reproductive success to
each cooperator that they can achieve without cooperation. Jones, Child Abuse, supra note 32, at
1150-51. In contrast, reciprocal altruism occurs in conditions under which the altruistic actor defers
reproductive gains or incurs an immediate reproductive loss in order to achieve a net reproductive
gain over not acting altruistically. Jones, Child Abuse, supranote 32, at 1150-51.
131. A is more likely to confer the benefit today if it is a less costly favor. Thus, if A is a
successful hunter today and A and his kin cannot eat all of his kill before it spoils, then A is likely to
be willing to share with B. If A finds a way to preserve the meat or his family is quite hungry, then A
may be less willing to reach out and share with B.
132. See generally Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of ReciprocalAltruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY
35 (1971).
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C.

Cheaters,MoralisticAggression, And Tit-For-Tat

Therein lies one of the main problems of cooperation. How does one
ensure that B will reciprocate? Indeed, if cooperation creates benefits for
the group, it is in B's self-interest, and increased relative reproductive
success to enjoy the gains without taking the risks or expending the effort
of cooperative action. This is the classic "free-rider," Prisoner's
Dilemma, or cheater problem.'
If cheating benefits the individual, cheating behavior becomes
evolutionarily adaptive. In the face of potential cheating, however, it
would be similarly advantageous for others to discourage or retaliate
against cheaters. In fact, those who have the capacity to precommit
themselves to punishing cheaters, even at a cost to themselves, may be
better able to ensure cooperative reciprocation by their beneficiaries."'
The emotional urge to retaliate, sometimes called a retributive instinct,
can therefore be adaptive. Experimental economists have found that
subjects are willing to incur real costs to punish those who defect, free
ride, or behave unfairly.'35 Biologists call this retaliatory behavior
moralistic aggression,13 and it extends beyond human efforts to get
even.'37 Consider, for example, the interaction between three
chimpanzees in a colony at the Arnhem Zoo.' One of the larger adult
females, Puist, supported Luit, one of the dominant males, in chasing
Niklde, another male. When Nikkie later behaved threateningly toward
Puist, she held out her hand to solicit support from Luit. When Luit

133. This problem of inducing beneficial cooperation when individuals have incentives to cheat,
or not cooperate, is at the core of law and economics. See CHARLES J. Gos'z, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS, Ch. I (1984) (chapter devoted to Prisoner's Dilemma, freerider problem, and external effects created).
134. Cf FRANK, supra note 69, at 48 (binding commitment to file costly suit could deter bad
behavior by others).
135. See Elizabeth Hoffman et al., On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum
Games, 25 INT'L J. GAME THEORY 289, 300 (1996) (finding subjects willing to give up profits to
punish those who take too large a share of the total dollar amount to be distributed); Elizabeth
Hoffman et al., Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in BargainingGames, 7 GAMES &
ECON. BEHAv. 346 (1994) (same); see also Emst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Cooperation and
Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 90 AMER. ECON. REV. 980 (2000) (finding subjects
heavily punish free riders in public goods experiments).
136. E. Donald Elliott, Law and Biology: The New Synthesis?, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 595, 609
(1997).
137. See generally Frans de Waal, Food Sharing and Reciprocal Obligations Among
Chimpanzees, 18 J. HUMAN EVOLUTION 433 (1989).
138. This zoo in the Netherlands offers the rare opportunity to observe a relatively large
population of chimpanzees interacting within an enclosed, outdoor natural habitat.
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failed to help Puist, she immediately chased Luit while barking furiously,
and hit him.'39
The general logic behind cooperation and retaliation is central to game
theory, a set of tools used by both biologists and economists. Game
theorists apply the Prisoners' Dilemma game 40 to explore the conflict
between self-interest and the common good. Two individuals may be
jointly better off if they cooperate with one another, but individually,
each prefers to defect. In the classic Prisoner's Dilemma paradigm, the
individuals are jointly worst off if each defects, but without some way to
bind each party to cooperate, the dominant strategy for each player is to
defect. By contrast, the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma shows how egoists
can achieve cooperation based on their own self-interest and independent
of notions of morality and ethics."' When players anticipate that they
will interact indefinitely into the future, the gains from defecting today
are more than offset by the lost opportunity to reap cooperative gains
over time. 42 If each player can adopt a strategy that deters defection by
the other, then cooperation can emerge. This was borne out by the
experiments of Robert Axelrod who used computers that tested game
theorists' strategies in a repeat Prisoner's Dilemma game.143 The
submitted program that performed best overall started by cooperating
and then mirrored each previous move of the other player. Defection was
met with defection, and cooperation with cooperation. Axelrod reasoned
that the robust character of this strategy, known as "tit-for-tat," came
from a combination of niceness, retaliation, forgiveness, and clarity:
Its niceness prevents it from getting into unnecessary trouble. Its
retaliation discourages the other side from persisting whenever
defection is tried. Itsforgiveness helps restore mutual cooperation.

139. TIRVERS, supra note 104, at 377. Trivers' description of chimpanzee interaction in this
colony originates from FRANS DE WAAL, CHIMPANZEE POLITICS: POWER AND SEX AMONG APES
207 (1982).
140. See supra, note 34, for a description of the classic model.
141. For treatments of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the emergence of cooperation, and the basic
irrationality of homo economicus, see generally MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF
COOPERATION (1987); EDNA ULLMAN-MARGALIT, THE EMERGENCE OF NORMS (1977); DAVID
COLLARD, ALTRUSIM AND ECONOMY (1978); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the
Behavioral Foundationsof Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 317 (1977); FRANK, supra
note 69.
142. The lost future gains are premised on an assumption that when a player defects, the other
defects from that point forward. See James W. Friedman, A Non-Cooperative Equilibrium for
Supergames, 28 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 1 (1971) (presenting trigger strategy of perpetual defection
under conditions of certainty to maintain equilibrium of cooperation).
143. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
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And its clarity makes it intelligible to the other player, thereby
eliciting long-term cooperation.'"
Playing a "survival of the fittest" game pitting several strategies
against one another in random encounters, Axelrod found that nice, naive
strategies suffered at the hands of nasty/defection-prone strategies, but
after eliminating enough of the nice ones, nasty strategies began running
into each other and declining. Tit-for-tat then emerged as the most
successful strategy. 4 '
So, how does this fit into biology and evolution? Prior to Axelrod's
computer simulations, a geneticist, John Maynard Smith, borrowed the
game from the economists and adapted it to biology. 4 6 He created a
game
between
Hawks
(aggressive/defectors)
and
Doves
(passive/cooperators). 47 If a Hawk encounters a Dove, the former easily
defeats the latter. If two Hawks encounter each other, they are both badly
wounded, but if two Doves encounter each other, they receive benefits.
Smith showed that natural selection would result in an evolved instinct to
engage in an evolutionarily stable strategy, one in which no one animal
using the strategy would be worse off than an animal using another
strategy.'48 When the game is played over and over, the Hawks thrive at
the expense of the Doves; however, as the population of Doves
decreases, the Hawk population declines as Hawks mostly encounter
each other. A successful strategy is one in which a Dove acts like a Dove
when encountering other Doves and turns into a Hawk, or retaliates,
when encountering a Hawk. Essentially, this behaviorally plastic strategy
is also tit-for-tat.'4 9
One deters others from defecting with repeat interactions and the
threat of retaliation. Repeat interactions create an anticipation of future
144. Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
145. See id. at 53-54.
146. J. Maynard Smith & G.R. Price, The Logic ofAnimal Conflict, NATURE, NOV. 2,1973, at 15.
For a discussion of the contribution of the Smith and Price article, see MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS
OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 59-60 (1997).
147. "In the original paper, the term 'dove' was changed at the last minute to 'mouse' in
deference to George Price's religious sensibilities." RIDLEY, supranote 146, at 271 n.6.
148. J. Maynard Smith, Optimization Theory in Evolution, 9 ANNUAL REV. OF ECOL. &
SYSTEMATICS 31 (1978). The evolutionarily stable strategy is similar to the Nash equilibrium. "A
Nash equilibrium for a game is a collection of strategies, one for each player, such that every
player's strategy is optimal given that the other players use their equilibrium strategy." H. SCOTT
BIERMAN & LUIS FERNANDEZ, GAME THEORY WITH ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 81 (1993) (emphasis
omitted). The Nash equilibrium was first described in John Nash, Non-Cooperative Games, 54
ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS 286 (1951).
149. See RIDLEY, supra note 146, at 60 ("Tit-for-tat is in practice another name for Maynard
Smith's Retaliator.").
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benefits that one does not wish to risk by behaving non-cooperatively,
and retaliation can make non-cooperation too costly, even without the
prospect of future cooperative benefits. Thus, a sufficient retaliatory
threat helps assure that people will behave according to a variety of
shared norms that foster cooperative behavior, either directly or
indirectly.
2.

Emotions Temper Emotions: Apology And Retribution

Reciprocity is central to human and other highly social primate
societies. The phrases "I'll scratch your back, if you'll scratch mine,"
"one good turn deserves another,....
do unto others.. . ,"and "an eye for
an eye" illustrate its centrality to humans. Unfortunately, however, noncompliant behavior inevitably occurs. Sometimes one defects by
accident, oversight, misunderstanding, short-sighted selfish impulses,
indifference, or just plain meanness. Given the defection, retaliation can
prove costly to both the transgressor and the victim. The transgressor
experiences guilt and the dread of future retaliation, itself
psychologically costly, and focuses her resources on defensive rather
than productive activities. The victim also invests both material and
psychological resources into non-productive activities. Guilt, anger,
spite, fear, and defensive and retaliatory acts are all proximately caused
by our physiology and bio-chemistry in combination with our unique life
experiences. The ultimate causes of these emotions and behaviors should
be viewed in the context of adaptive strategies over evolutionary time.
However, if people were behaviorally plastic, they could find ways to
minimize the costs of noncompliance. In other words, both transgressors
and victims would be better off if they could find some way to temper
the costs of moralistic aggression.
Re-enter apology and forgiveness. In Tavuchis' influential
sociological study of apology, he states that apologetic behavior is "not
easily explicated by elementary conceptions of reciprocity."' 50 We
respectfully disagree. Together, apology and forgiveness can work to set
the individuals on the road to future reciprocation and cooperation. At a
minimum, they can help the parties avoid the non-productive aspects of
moralistic aggression. A promise of forbearance and offer of repair seem
more appealing than revenge to both parties, if they can be induced to put
their negative emotions aside. In addition, the most effective way to

150. TAVUCHIS, supra note 16, at 34.
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soften the victim is to place him in a position of power vis-A-vis the
transgressor. Thus, the role of the elements of apology are clarified.
If this description of how apology and forgiveness fit more broadly
into human interactions is at all accurate, then a capacity to develop the
emotional framework necessary for the effective use of apology and
forgiveness can be seen as adaptive. Those who feel a need to apologize
and forgive can conserve their resources for activities that enhance their
survivability and reproductive fitness. They thus are placed at a
competitive advantage relative to those individuals who must incur the
full costs of moralistic aggression.
Scientists have found evidence that non-human primates possess a
somewhat similar taste for post-conflict conciliation.' Frans de Waal, a
noted ethologist, explains the similarities:
I first realized that this subject can be studied in other species after
witnessing a fight in the chimpanzee colony of the Arnhem Zoo in
the Netherlands. It was the winter of 1975 and the colony was kept
indoors. In the course of a charging display, the dominant male
attacked a female, which caused screaming chaos as othpr
chimpanzees came to her defense. When the group finally calmed
down, an unusual silence followed, with nobody moving, as if the
apes were waiting for something. Suddenly the entire colony burst
out hooting, while one male worked the large metal drums in the
corner of the hall. In the midst of the pandemonium I saw two
chimpanzees kiss and embrace.
Strange as it may sound, it took me hours to realize what had
happened. I kept thinking about the embrace and the excited group
response. It seemed more than a mere sequence of interesting
behavior patterns: the embracing individuals had been the same
male and female of the initial fight. When the word "reconciliation"
popped into my mind, it immediately illuminated the connection.
From that day on I noticed that emotional reunions between
aggressors and victims were quite common. The phenomenon

151. See generally Frans de Waal, Reconciliation among Primates: A Review of Empirical
Evidence and TheoreticalIssues, in PRIMATE SOCIAL CONFLICT 111 (William A. Mason & Sally P.
Mendoza eds., 1993); Frans de Waal & R. Ren, Comparison of the reconciliation behavior of
stumptail and rhesus macaques, 78 ETHOLOGY 129 (1988); Frans de Waal & A. Van Roosmalen,
Reconciliation and consolation among chimpanzees, 5 BEHAV. ECOL. SOCIOBIOL. 55 (1979); Frans
de Waal & D. Yoshihara, Reconciliation and RedirectedAffection in Rhesus Monkeys, 85 BEHAVIOR
224 (1983); A. York & T. Rowell, Reconciliation Following Aggression in Patas Monkeys, 36
ANIM. BEHAV. 502 (1988); Karolina Westlun et al., Post-ConflictAffiliation in Common Marmosets,
52 AMER. J. PRIMATOLOGY 31 (2000).
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became as obvious that it was hard to imagine that it had been
52
overlooked for so long by me and by scores of other ethologists.
Focusing on forgiveness rather than apology, de Waal comments:
Forgiveness is not, as some people seem to believe, a mysterious
and sublime idea that we owe to a few millennia of JudeoChristianity. It did not originate in the minds of people and cannot
therefore be appropriated by an ideology or a religion. The fact that
monkeys, apes, and humans all engage in reconciliation behavior
means that it is probably over thirty million years old, preceding the
evolutionary divergence of these primates .... reconciliation
behavior must be seen as a shared heritage of the primate order.
Our species has many conciliatory gestures and contact patterns in
common with the apes (stretching out a hand, smiling, kissing,
embracing, and so on).'53
Concluding that non-human conflict resolution is equivalent to the
human version is difficult, however, for two reasons. First, and most
obviously, the non-humans lack language.154 Second, the dominance
hierarchies are stronger for some non-human primate species. As a
consequence in these hierarchies, the subordinate typically approaches
the dominant to seek out conciliation.'5 5 In the relatively more egalitarian
human relationship, the transgressor approaches the wronged party to
request forgiveness. 56 But, for both species, one party places itself in a
position of clear powerlessness relative to another and performs an act
that resembles a plea for future conflict to subside. To some extent then,
human reconciliation has parallels in the rest of the animal world.

152. FRANS DE WAAL, PEACEMAKING AMONG PRIMATES 5 (1989).
153. Id. at 270-71.
154. But see id. at 271 ("Language and culture merely add a degree of subtlety and variation to
human peacemaking strategies."). Non-humans are capable of communication.
155. De Waal notes that although the peacemaking initiative is divided equally between dominant
and subordinate chimpanzees, dominants typically refuse to initiate reconciliations following heavy
physical aggression and during changes in the dominance hierarchy. Id. at 44. De Waal also notes
that in stumptail monkeys, 94% of the reconciliation rituals begin by subordinate initiation, and the
process highlights the dominance hierarchy. Id. at 163-65. In contrast, Bonobos, who are in many
ways behaviorally closest to humans, typically reconcile with initiation by dominants (who typically
start the conflict). Id. at 220.
156. Nevertheless, one interesting implication of evolutionary biology is that we should expect to
see effective apologies by subordinates more often than we see apologies by dominants in
hierarchical human settings. In these circumstances, apologies would serve the additional function of
reinforcing the hierarchy. Hickson, supra note 29, at 285-87, finds that apology is relatively more
important in hierarchical human societies, although it is difficult to know whether it is the
hierarchical or the kin-based nature of these societies that drives the result.
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3.

Deception And Discernment

Strategically, the parties face a potential "time-inconsistency"' 5 7
problem with apology and forgiveness. Ex post each individual is better
off with conciliation than with moralistic aggression, but ex ante the
possibility of conciliation can undercut the deterrent value of the threat
of retaliation. In fact, a truly strategic person understands that he can get
away with cheating, defection, and free-riding behavior by apologizing
after the fact. To the extent that the victim feels compelled to forgive in
the face of an apology, that victim becomes vulnerable to potential
predation, making the emotional framework potentially maladaptive
rather than adaptive. 5
This raises the problem of deception by cheaters and discernment or
detection by cooperators. Common examples of adaptive inter-species
deception in nature include camouflage and mimicry.'59 The reproductive
advantages available from free riding on the benefits of cooperation
make intra-species deception similarly adaptive. After all, "the ability to
elicit
altruistically
cooperative
acts
from
others without
reciprocating.., makes
Gullible's
loss
Deceiver's
gain."'60
Communication and signaling thus become opportunities for deception,
but the potential costs of deception create countervailing evolutionary
pressures that favor the ability to detect deceit and identify cheaters. A
co-evolutionary arms race ensues in which increasingly skilled deception
is matched by increasingly skilled discernment. 6 ' To be effective,

157. The term originated in the macroeconomic literature but refers generally to conflicting
incentives across time. See generally Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, Rules, Discretion and
Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy, 12 J. MONETARY ECON. 101 (1983); Finn E. Kydland &
Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL.
ECON. 473 (1977).
158. Cf. Jeffrie G. Murphy, Symposium, The Role of Forgivenessin the Lav, 27 FORDHAM URB.
L. J. 1351, 1359 (2000) ("If I were going to set out to oppress other people, I would surely prefer to
select for my victims persons whose first response is forgiveness rather than persons whose first
response is revenge.").
159. Camouflage enables an animal to avoid detection by predators, while mimicry enables an
animal to free ride off of the adaptive features of another species. Jones, Child Abuse, supranote 32,
at 1151.
160. Id.
161. Robert Trivers, Deceit and Self-Deception: The Relationship Between Communication and
Consciousness,in MAN AND BEAST REVISITED 175, 176 (Michael H. Robinson & Lionel Tiger eds.,
1991). In fact, our large brain size may ultimately be attributable, at least in part, to an evolutionary
arms race between deceivers and detectors of deception.
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cheating behavior must become increasingly covert, but then this creates
62
selection pressure to become increasingly skilled at detecting cheating.
We suggest here that similar co-evolutionary pressures have been at
work in the context of apology and forgiveness. One way to induce
another to cooperate is to make a promise about future performance, and
apology is, in part, a promise to comply with shared norms henceforth.
The transgressor proffers an apology in an attempt to obtain forgiveness
and induce the victim to continue in a cooperative relationship that yields
her benefits. In this sense, an apology, even when made sincerely, can be
a form of deception in order to, as Ambrose
Bierce cynically noted, "lay
163
the foundation for a future offense.',
Generous forgivers who can discern sincere from insincere apologies
have an advantage over both uniformly generous and stingy forgivers.
The discerning forgiver can minimize the ex post costs of moralistic
aggression while simultaneously maintaining the deterrent value of
potential retaliation and possibly reestablishing mutually-beneficial
cooperation. Leda Cosmides'" describes the uncanny ability that people
have to detect cheating behavior in those around them. Other studies
indicate that lay people are significantly better than chance at detecting
deception.'6 5 At this point, it becomes clearer why apology has grown so
nuanced over time. The more intricate the components of an apology, the
better able the victim is to discern the sincerity of the transgressor's
communicated remorse.
To the extent that forgiveness turns on the perceived sincerity of an
apology, victims can punish perceived insincere apologies in at least two
ways. First, a victim can invest even more effort in retaliation than she
would have otherwise. Second, and relatedly, she can reveal the
transgressor's statement to third parties in an effort to further damage the
transgressor's reputation. 166 After all, prior to the insincere apology, the
162. Thus, the best deceivers are self-deceivers because they are less likely to show the behavioral
and physiological cues if they are not conscious of their deceptive intent. See id.
163. TAVUCHIS, supra note 16, at 7 (quoting AMBROSE BIERCE, THE DEVILS' DICTIONARY 12
(1958)).
164. Leda Cosmides, The Logic ofSocial Exchange: Has Natural Selection ShapedHow Humans
Reason? Studies with the Wason Selection Task, 31 COGNITION 187 (1989).
165. See generally Bella DePaulo, Miron Zuckerman & Robert Rosenthal, Humans as Lie
Detectors, 30 J. COMMUNICATIONS 129 (Spring 1980); Miron Zuckerman, Bella DePaulo, & Robert
Rosenthal, Verbal and Nonverbal Communication ofDeception, 14 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (1981); Linda Mealey et al., Enhanced Memory for Faces of Cheaters, 17
ETHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOL. 119 (1996).

166. Sometimes a person wants an apology from the transgressor primarily to avoid reputational
harm from third parties. Suppose, for example, that two contracting parties agree to cooperate to
construct a building that collapses in a strong wind. Others know that someone likely made a
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victim had only her word to draw out others' scorn, but after the
insincere apology, the victim often is armed with the transgressor's own
admission of guilt. Reputational harm can have the effect of getting
others to punish the transgressor. That said, individual abilities to deceive
and to detect deception will vary, so some but not all insincere apologies
will be discouraged.
4.

The Costs Of Signaling

The problem of deception and discernment is at the heart of
communication and signaling. In addition to kin selection and
reciprocity, communication and signaling induce cooperative behavior.
In the absence of kinship, prior interaction, or reputation, potential
cooperators may rely on some form of communication or signal 67 that is
a sufficiently reliable indicator of future performance to warrant present
performance in return. Unfortunately for cooperators, it is adaptive for
cheaters to develop signals that fraudulently induce performance. How
can potential cooperators rely on signals? Biologists think the solution
lies in the "handicap principle," whereby the costliness of the signal is a
measure of its reliability. 168 The investment in signals is similar to
"handicaps" imposed on stronger contestants in a game. A handicap
proves that the victor's win is due to mastery, not chance. Thus, the
peacock's tail or massive antlers are not waste or disabilities, but rather
handicaps in this sense, which allow an individual animal to demonstrate
its quality. 169 The handicap principle derives from models of asymmetric
information that have long been used in economics and law to
distinguish sorting equilibria. In those models, cooperators and cheaters

mistake, but it may be difficult to discern from afar which party was at fault. The non-faulty party
may demand an apology from the faulty party in order to show others that he is free from blame. In
these situations, the non-faulty party will not likely be concerned with the sincerity of the apology.
167. "Signals" are traits whose value to the signaler is that they convey information to those that
receive them. ZAHAVI & ZAHAVI, supra note 114, at 58-59.
168. Id. With respect to signaling and costs, see generally Rufus A. Johnstone, Game Theory and
Communication, in GAME THEORY AND ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 94 (Lee Alan Dugatkin & Hudson Kern
Reeve eds., 1998); John Maynard Smith, Honest Signalling: The Philip Sidney Game, 42 ANIMAL
BEHAV. 1034 (1991).
169. ZAHAVI & ZAHAVI, supra note 114, at xiv. By managing to find food and avoid predators
despite the burden of its tail, the peacock proves he is a high quality mate. By wasting precious
escape time and energy by drawing attention to itself through stotting and exposing its conspicuous
rump, the gazelle displays its confidence that it can outrun the predator, saving both from an
unnecessary expenditure of energy.
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are separated with differentially costly signals, and pooling equilibria,
where the signals are not reliable indicators of performance or quality.17
A reliable signal must make cheating or faking unprofitable-the
signaler must invest more in the signal than it would gain by conveying
phony information:
[T]he investment in the signal is a reasonable one for a truthful
suitor to make, but prohibitive or unprofitable for a cheater. The
more the suitor stands to gain, and the bigger the loss to one who
accepts a false suitor, the more the signaler must7 invest in the signal
in order to reliably demonstrate his superiority.' '
The ability to observe and understand signals is adaptive-an
individual that pays attention to unreliable signals will be less successful
and have fewer descendants than one who only pays attention to reliable
signals.
Changes in the environment may lessen or increase the cost of
providing the signal:
If... the cost of a signal is reduced to the extent that every
individual can use it equally well, then the signal can no longer
reveal differences in the quality or motivation of individuals. In
such a case, the signal loses its value... [it] is no longer useful and
will disappear.'
One of many examples of a loss of signal value in nature involves the
behavior of the male satin bowerbird. These birds favor blue objects, a
color not readily found in their natural environment. They compete by
stealing blue objects from one another and destroying each other's
bowers. When the birds live near picnic areas where blue objects have
become more abundant, however, the birds put less effort into stealing
the objects and more effort into destroying each other's bowers.7 3 In the

170. For treatments of signaling in economics and law, see. e.g., ERIC RASMUSSEN, GAMES AND
INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 249-71 (2d ed. 1994); see generally ERIC A.
POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON.
355 (1973); Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L REV.
1781 (2000); Claudio Signorotti, Eficiency of Legal Restrictions on Contracts in the Presence of
Two Signals, 20 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 511 (2000); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The
ProperRole of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161
(1981).
171. ZAHAVI & ZAHAVI, supra note 114, at 27.
172. Id. at 59 (emphasis in original).
173. Id. at 60.
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evolution 74 of signals-signal selection-cost is the fundamental
variable.
Apology serves a signaling function. After transgressing a norm,the
transgressor can use an apology to induce the victim to take the risk of
reestablishing cooperative behavior. Recall that apology entails an
explicit or implicit promise of future non-offending performance and
assurance that the offense was not indicative of the offender's character,
i.e., "I really am a Dove even though I acted as a Hawk last time." Under
the handicap principle, however, the credibility of an apology is judged
in part by its perceived cost to the apologizer. The more costly the
apology appears to be, the more reliable it tends to be, and the less
costly, the less reliable it is. Cost can make apologies reliable, but they
can also reduce the likelihood of an apology. If the environment in which
apology takes places changes so as to increase or reduce the cost of that
signal, then both its incidence and its value as a reliable indicator of
future cooperation adjusts accordingly.
5. IncorporatingEvolutionaryBiology Into Economics
Law and economics has been quite influential over the past three
decades because the tools of economics enable lawyers to think more
rigorously about how law can affect behavior. Economic models help to
predict behavior by assuming people will behave rationally in pursuit of
their interests. Although not all individuals will behave rationally all the
time, economic models are nevertheless quite helpful in predicting
whether more or fewer people in the population will behave in a
particular manner if legal reforms are introduced.
Nonetheless, law and economics has its weaknesses. Economists
remain agnostic when it comes to defining or ascertaining the contents of
individual utility functions, which in turn determine people's "self
interest."'" 5 Preferences, which make up utility, are left for exploration

174. As opposed to the evolution of other adaptations in which the cost is simply a side effect. Id.
175. See Jack Hirshleifer, Economics From a Biological Viewpoint, 20 J.L. & ECON. 1, 17 (1977)
("Modem neoclassical economics has foreswom any attempt to study the source and content of
preferences, that is, the goals that motivate men's actions. It has regarded itself as the logic of choice
under conditions of 'given tastes"); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to
Rational Actors: A Crtiqueof Classical Law and Economics, 65 Ct.-KENT L. REv. 23, 44 (1989)
("mainstream economic theory takes tastes as exogenous givens"); Amy L. Wax, Against NatureOn Robert Wright's The MoralAnimal,63 U. CHI. L. REV. 307,307-08 (1996).
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by psychologists.'76 In the meantime, economists make assumptions
about individual preferences, and models work more effectively where
the assumed preferences are clear, or at least not hopelessly vague, and
quantifiable. In the spirit of simple modeling, law and economic scholars
typically assume that people desire money, or wealth, to the exclusion of
their tastes for other things. Most law and economic scholars will readily
admit that human preferences extend beyond material wealth, but
reductionist models can generate testable predications about behavior
that cannot be garnered from more realistic analysis.
Evolutionary biology is proving to be tremendously valuable to
economists because it helps them identify people's non-material desires
while providing a rigorous method of analysis." 7 Stated differently,
biology enables economists to see that seemingly "irrational" behavior is
indeed quite rational. 7 ' More importantly, economists can use
evolutionary biology to better predict behavior. Our supposition is that
biological insights regarding apology and forgiveness can improve, in
important ways, the law and economics models of suit and settlement.
Before we address that topic, however, we need to further explore one
economist's use of evolutionary biology to explain (and model) altruistic
behavior.
Economist Robert Frank has developed an evolutionary framework to
explain that altruistic or moral acts can fit comfortably within a broadly
conceived rational choice paradigm for behavior.'79 Frank begins by
noting that we often observe people confer benefits on others even when
the beneficiaries have no immediate self-interest in doing so. People tip
cab drivers and waiters in towns they will never return to.' In
experimental settings, subjects often cooperate even in one-shot
Prisoner's Dilemma contexts.' Wallets are returned with the money.'

176. See Ulrich Witt, Economics, Sociobiology, and BehavioralPsychology on Preferences, 12 1.
ECON. PSYCHOL. 557, 562 (1991) (explaining failure of economics to develop hypotheses about
human tastes).
177. See Hirshleifer, supra note 175, at 17-26 (discussing biology's important advances in
identifying scientifically analyzable human tastes and preferences).
178. See generally Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage:
Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1141 (2001) (arguing that
behavior that is irrational in a modem environment may have been rational in ancestral
environments) [hereinafter Time-Shifted Rationality].
179. FRANK, supra note 69.
180. Id. at 17-18.
181. Id. at 140.
182. See id. at 214 (describing experiment in New York City where 45% of "lost" wallets were
returned to the "owner").
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Charities collect generous donations.1 83 Selfish behavior is also
abundantly observable, however. Spouses leave each other for greater
sexual gratification elsewhere. Partners take money and property from
the business. Kitty Genovese was murdered after a gruesome and
prolonged attack that was overheard by at least thirty-eight neighbors,
none of whom attempted to intervene or call police.8 4 At the extreme,
sociopaths seem utterly incapable of caring about their fellow citizens.'
Selfish behaviors and our efforts to avoid harmfully selfish individuals
are somewhat ubiquitous, but we provide a single experimental example
here. One of us runs a game in which several law students sit at a table
with $.50 in the middle. According to the instructions, if all of the
students can wait for two minutes without taking the money on the table,
each will get a dollar, but if one of them takes the two quarters off the
table before the time expires, the taker can keep the $.50, but each of the
other students receives nothing. Invariably, someone will take the money
shortly before the two minutes expires. The taker, although often
somewhat apologetic, typically attempts to justify his behavior on the
grounds of self-defense. More specifically, the student typically reasons
that someone else would have taken the money if he hadn't. In those
circumstances, the student feels justified in taking the money first to
prevent exploitation. When played once between naive players (those
that have no knowledge or experience with each other), this selfish
strategy is optimal in response to the probable strategies of the other
players. 6 It places the player in the least worst position in any
circumstance. Curiously, when the other players are asked why they
didn't take the money sooner, losing students often state that they prefer
cooperation even when the risk of receiving nothing is high. If the class
is asked to choose those students with which they would like to
negotiate, none choose the player who took the money.
Frank asserts that altruism and selfishness can co-exist in a stable
society. He states that altruists can survive and thrive, but only if the
altruists are able to identify one another. Defectors will take advantage of
cooperators if they can, but if cooperators can tell which people are
defectors, then the cooperators can avoid being preyed upon. When
cooperators can find each other, they thrive compared to defectors. 8 7 In
183. See FRANK, supranote 69, at 222 (discussing charitable contributions in the United States).
184. Id.at 43.
185. Id. at 42.
186. This condition, known as the Nash equilibrium, is discussed supra at note 149 and
accompanying text.
187. FRANK, supranote 69, at 57-60.
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the long run, the individual who can precommit to avoid behaving
selfishly may fare better because others are more likely to deal with him.
In deciding whom to contract with, whom to hire, whom to marry, etc.,
we look for signs that the other is trustworthy.'88 In general, then, we
hope to find people who will not defect, or cheat, or steal, or shirk--even
when we are not looking. Altruists seek altruists for cooperative gains.
Defectors seek altruists for exploitation. In either case, altruism, or
cooperation is desirable, but the challenge, for the altruists, is to identify
defectors and punish or avoid them. Because punishment is itself costly,
it can be viewed as its own form of altruism.
Frank asserts that altruists commit themselves to cooperate, and to
retaliate, with their emotions:
Certain of the emotions-anger, contempt, disgust, envy, greed,
shame and guilt-were described by Adam Smith as moral
sentiments. The reward theory of behavior tells us that these
sentiments, like feelings of hunger, can and do compete with the
feelings that spring from rational calculations about material
payoffs. For exactly this reason, they can help people solve the
commitment problem.'8 9
Honesty can make one feel good inside, but the material payoff comes
from being able to cooperate with other honest individuals.'90 The
capacity to feel a strong bond of love leaves one feeling warm and fuzzy,
but the payoff comes from marrying a person who is similarly inclined.''
And, the impulse to seek revenge only materially benefits the person who
can deter opportunism against her by reliably signaling that she has such
an impulse.' 2 To succeed, the cooperators must devise a signal of their
cooperative natures that is difficult for defectors to mimic. Because
signaling in this context is both costly and imperfect, the population will
retain a mix of cooperators and defectors. The higher the costs of

188. Trustworthiness also may be discernible from honorable behavior. For a discussion of the
due] as a historic mechanism for men to signal their honor, see generally Warren F. Schwartz, Keith
Baxter & David Ryan, The Duel: Can These Gentlemen Be Acting Efficiently, 13 J. LEGAL STUD.
321 (1984).
189. See FRANK, supra note 69, at 53; see also Jack Hirshleifer, On the Emotions as Guarantors
of Threats and Promises, in THE LATEST ON THE BEST: ESSAYS IN EVOLUTION AND OPTIMALITY
307, 311-21 (John Dupre ed., 1987) (presenting models that indicate emotions can have strategic
value); VICTOR S. JOHNSTON, WHY WE FEEL: THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN EMOTIONS 167-80 (1999)
(in repeating Prisoner's Dilemma and other situations, emotions are evolutionarily valuable).
190. FRANK, supra note 69, at 54.
191. Id.
192. Id.

1166

On Apology and Consilience
scrutiny, the higher the proportion of defectors who can thrive in the
population.
Cooperators can, in fact, signal their predisposition to cooperate in
two ways. First, physical symptoms help to reveal others' emotions, and
these emotional reactions help people commit themselves to cooperative
behaviors. Turning red when one gets angry, blanching and looking
awkWard when one feels guilty, and smiling gleefully when one feels
good about helping others, are all ways that people expose their
sentiments. Because these physical signals come from automatic nervous
system responses to emotional arousal, through pulse, blood pressure,
and muscle tightening in the vocal cords, facial muscles,93 and elsewhere,
94
these physical signals are costly, though not impossible, to fake.'
Reputation, already familiar to economics and law,"5 is the second
means by which cooperators signal their natures. In comparison,

193. As Frank acknowledges:
We now know, of course, that there are virtually no nerve pathways that are not at least partly
subject to conscious manipulation. The accomplished yogi, for example, can regulate body
temperature, pulse rate, blood pressure, and other metabolic processes that in most people are
well beyond purposeful control. Even untrained people, with effort, are often able to suppress
deeply habituated movements and actions. Yet there remains a clear hierarchy among pathways
in the nervous system, with some much more susceptible to conscious control than others.
Id.at 118-19.
194. Charles Darwin described the same general phenomenon through three principles for the
expression of emotion. The first, his "principle of serviceable associated habits," suggests that
instinctive rather than conscious patterned physiological responses to situations often best serve the
needs of the animal:
Certain complex actions are of direct or indirect service under certain states of the mind, in
order to relieve or gratify certain sensations, desires, etc.; and whenever the same state of mind
is introduced, however feebly, there is a tendency through the force of habit and association for
the same movements to be performed, though they may not then be of the least use.
CHARLES DARWIN, THE EXPRESSION OF THE EMOTIONS IN MAN AND ANIMALS 28 (1872). Darwin's
second, "antithesis principle," asserts that opposite emotional situations tend to lead to strikingly
opposite physiological responses, as with the attack versus affectionate postures in dogs. Id. at 5053. Darwin's third, the "principle of direct action of the nervous system," suggests that when
aroused, animals will devote this excess energy in predictable, if not entirely useful ways. Id. at 66.
195. See generally, Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring
Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL ECON. 615 (1981); David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson,
Reputation and Imperfect Information, 27 J. ECON. TIMORY 253 (1982); Lewis A. Komhauser,
Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L & EcON. 691 (1983); Thomas J. Miceli &
Metin M. Cosgel, Reputation andJudicialDecision-Malang,23 J.ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 31 (1994);
Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory ofDefault Rules for CommercialContracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD.
597 (1990); Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals and SocialNorms in Politicsand the Law, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 765 (1998); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, SharingAmong the Human Capitalists:
An Economic Inquiry into the CorporateLaw Firm and How Parners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 313 (1985); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Cooperation
Through Rules, Norm's andInstitutions,99 MICH. L REV. 1724 (2001).
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defectors are eventually found out through their non-cooperative actions,
and negative gossip spreads the word. Of course, reputation is an
imperfect signal. One can spread negative lies about another. One can
fail to perform through no fault of his own. And, in reality, even people
who generally reciprocate can eventually encounter a temptation to
defect that is so great 96it overcomes even a strong emotional
predisposition to cooperate.

Returning to apology, part of its purpose is for a transgressor to signal
that she is basically a good person who has fallen from grace but
promises to behave better in the future. The apologist hopes to avoid the
transgressor's ostracism by signaling that she is in fact a cooperator. The
apologist often hopes to repair the damage to her reputation that occurs
when third parties witness or hear about her transgression. But the focus
on reputation is only part of the story of apology and forgiveness.
Effective apologies and forgivenesses, are those that seem compelled by
emotional forces that transcend. Such apologies indeed often interfere
with momentary rational calculations about reputation. Apologies can
have the effect of further exposing a transgressor, and forgiveness can be
accompanied by statements or actions that are unflattering to the victim.
We suggest that the emotional components to apology and forgiveness
help to signal a deeper individual commitment to cooperation than is
possible with the issue of the words alone. Put differently, the nuances of
apology, discussed earlier, help the victim discern whether the
transgressor is basically a cooperator, one driven by emotions (rather
than conscious calculation) to behave in general according to basic moral
principles, or instead a defector in disguise. Like Frank, we believe that
the powerful emotions apparent in sincere apologies and forgivenesses
actually help to serve the long-term reputational interests of cooperators
even though they can interfere with short-term strategic reputational
considerations.
Im. THE EFFECT OF LITIGATION ON APOLOGETIC BEHAVIOR
In Part II we argued that apology and forgiveness can be analyzed and
better understood from an evolutionary economic perspective.
Behavioral biologists have long understood that cooperation and spite are
adaptive, and that societies that can successfully create mechanisms to
196. This general idea lies behind the entrapment defense in criminal law. Police efforts to induce
defendant to commit a crime with sympathy or friendship, offers of inordinate gain, or by other
means that create strong temptation can enable defendant to avoid conviction. See WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 449-66 (3d ed. 2000).
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facilitate both cooperation and retribution are likely to thrive relative to
other societies. Recently, economists have focused on the importance of
trust to any system of exchange. 197 Such trust must come from some
sense of confidence that cooperators are abundant and defection is
discouraged. Accidents and lapses of judgment inevitably occur,
however, and retributivists who can temper their spite with forgiveness
in appropriate circumstances can conserve valuable resources and gain
an advantage relative to those who cannot. Recognizing this,
transgressors sometimes have an incentive to apologize, provided that
they can convince their victims of their sincerity.
In this Part, we consider the effect that the law has on apologetic
behavior. The insights from our evolutionary economic perspective are
incorporated into an informal game theoretic model to generate
implications lacking in previous treatments of apology. Section A briefly
describes the evidentiary issue that is currently debated by legal scholars
and state legislators. Section B presents an informal strategic framework
that considers the costs and benefits of apology and forgiveness and the
effect of the evidentiary rules on those incentives. In section C, we return
to the apology debate to elaborate on the policy implications of viewing
apology from an evolutionary economic perspective.
A.

A Summary Of The ProblemAnd CurrentlyProposedSolution

Legal commentators argue that apologetic behavior in the United
States is not encouraged and, at worst, is inhibited by the rules of
evidence in litigation. Although the precise effect of such an admission
on proving guilt or wrongdoing is debated, 98 all seem to agree that
apologies increase the risk that a transgressor will be held liable for
harms.

197. See generally Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization,36
J. LAW & EcoN. 453 (1993); Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut & Kevin McCabe, Trust, Reciprocity and
Social History, 10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAv. 122 (1995); Paul J. Zak & Stephen Knack, Trust and
Growth (1998), available at http.//papers.ssrn.comsol3/papers.cfin?abtractid=136961 (last visited
Oct. 16, 2002); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness and the Behavioral
Foundationsof CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. I- REV. 1735 (2001).
198. For one side of the debate, see WVagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 16, at 479 (noting that the
current law of evidence treats an apology as a "'queen of proof,' which can be used to prove the
claim"); Orenstein, supra note 17, at 248 (stating that "evidence law treats... naked
apologies ... as admissions."). For the other side of the debate, see Rehm & Beatty, supranote 10,
at 121-22 (discussing the non-dispositive nature of apology evidence in medical malpractice and
attorney discipline litigation, especially in cases where there is no other evidence of negligence).
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Under the Federal Rules of Evidence and most state evidence rules,
admissions by party opponents are admissible at trial.'99 Because
apologies include admissions of fault, evidence of apology is admissible
under Rule 801(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 200 Several
exceptions to this rule exist to partially protect apologies. For example,
Rule 408 makes inadmissible offers to compromise and statements made
during compromise negotiations.2 0° In addition to this protection of
statements made during settlement negotiations, many state statutes
provide for strong protection of mediation confidentiality. 2°2 Nebraska
law, as applied to the state's Parenting Act, provides an example:
[n]o records, notes, or other documentation, written or electronic,
of the mediation process, except the contents of a final agreement
between the parties, shall be examined in any judicial or
administrative proceeding. Any communications made confidential
by the act which become subject to judicial or administrative
process requiring the disclosure of such communications shall not
be disclosed.2 3
Third parties can, in conjunction with mediation or otherwise, enter a
confidentiality agreement to prevent disclosure of statements the parties
have made to one another. 0 4 Finally, parties can seek a judicial order
settlement
prohibiting the disclosure of statements made during
205
negotiations, including evidence of defendant's apology.

199. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 254 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (admission of a party
opponent).
200. See supranote 3.
201. FED R. EVID. 408 states:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or
promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a
claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for
or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations.
This rule also does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such
as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.
202. See Advising Clients, supra note 7, at 1036 n.93; Pamela A. Kentra, HearNo Evil, See No
Evil, Speak No Evil: The Intolerable Conflictfor Attorney-MediatorsBetween the Duty to Maintain
Mediation Confidentialityand the Duty to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 B.Y.U. L REv.
715, 733 (reviewing state mediation confidentiality statutes).
203. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2908.
204. Advising Clients, supra note 7, at 1039-1040.
205. Id. at 1040-41.
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While potentially useful in certain circumstances, apology advocates
claim that these safe harbors do not go far enough in protecting, and
thereby encouraging, apologies. Most importantly, for any of these
protections to apply, settlement negotiations or mediation is necessary.2 6
To the extent an effective apology precedes the formalization of the
dispute, that apology would remain unprotected. Furthermore, Rule 408,
by its own terms, provides only qualified protection. Evidence may be
"offered for another purpose, such as providing bias or prejudice of a
Witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to
obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution." ' 7 And, although one
party cannot use statements made during settlement negotiations against
the other party, it is not at all clear that the statements are inadmissible
by other plaintiffs or defendants. Further, complications can arise if
defendant is subject to both criminal and civil proceedings.2 8 The
protection afforded by mediation, although strong in some states, varies
dramatically from state to state, 0 9 and choice-of-law principles rarely
even clarify which state's law applies in multistate disputes." Finally,
confidentiality agreements that purport to mandate the exclusion of
evidence are typically disregarded on public policy grounds.2"
The incomplete protection of apology has been criticized by legal
scholars. A number of state legislatures have responded by considering
an expansion of the safe harbors for both expressions of sympathy and
apology." The apology advocates all desire to encourage apologies by
protecting transgressors from the legal consequences of their apologies.
In contrast, Lee Taft has argued that the current system is superior
because protecting apologies cheapens them and takes away their

206. Id. at 1035 ("[o]ften an offender will want to apologize immediately after the injury;

however, F.R.E. 408 may not cover such an apology'); see id. at 1038 ("parties typically go to
mediation only after the dispute has escalated, but, from a relational viewpoint, making an apology
very soon after the injury may be most helpful") (emphasis in the original); see id. at 1040
("obtaining a judicial order, if it comes at all, usually comes quite 'late in the game,' after litigation

is well under way").
207. MCCORMICK, supra note 200, at 467.
208. Advising Clients, supra note 7, at 1035; Carney v. Santa Cruz Women Against Rape, 271
Cal. Rptr. 30 (6th Dist. 1990) (letter of apology from female accuser admissible by falsely accused
man to prove liability of third party); United States v. Gonzales, 748 F.2d 74, 78 (2d. Cir. 1984)
(defendant's admission of forgery during settlement negotiations in civil suit admissible against
defendants in criminal case).
209. Advising Clients,supra note 7, at 1036-37.
210. Id. at 1037-38 n.98.
211. Id.at 1039.
212. See Taft,supra note 18.
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essential moral character.2 13 Just as one proves oneself a hero by facing
enormous risks, one proves oneself moral by apologizing in the face of
all possible costs.2 14 Taft is concerned that cheap apologies become
commodified, especially in the hands of lawyers.
Using tools of game theory, we explore the potential for the strategic
use of apologies. We agree with Taft that one must worry about the types
of apologies we encourage with our rules of evidence. Apologies entail
real costs and benefits to the parties even when they play no formal role
in litigation. In some sense, then, apologies are strategic tools before they
are treated legally. Taft is surely correct that using the law to increase the
cost of apology (by admitting them at trial) reduces the strategic
proffering of apologies. But, if we take that notion seriously, we would
simultaneously forbid the fact finder from considering the presence of
apology in determining damages. After all, when a transgressor
apologizes, fact finders typically impose less severe sanctions than they
would if they did not hear about the transgressor's apology.215 However,
if states eliminated consideration of apology in determining damages,
victims would have less incentive to forgive and more incentive to bring
the apology to the courthouse. In short, by using the law to make
apologies costly, opportunism by victims threatens to cheapen
forgiveness. Once the law treats apology at all, apologies have more
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1156 ("When an offender says, 'I'm sorry,' he must be willing to accept all of the
consequences-legal and otherwise--that flow from his violation. If a person is truly repentant, he
will not seek to distance himself from the consequences that attach to his action; rather, he will
accept them as a part of the performance of a moral act and the authentic expression of contrition.").
215. Some states expressly allow consideration of apology evidence as a mitigating factor when
determining damages in defamation cases. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 770.02 (West 1999) ("If it appears
upon the trial that. -. a full and fair correction, apology, or retraction was [published or
broadcast] ... then the plaintiff in such case shall recover only actual damages."); MiSS. CODE ANN.
§ 95-1-5 (1999) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99- 2 (1999) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-24-103
(1999) (same); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 13.003(a)(3) (West 1999) ("To determine the
extent and source of actual damages and to mitigate exemplary damages, the defendant in a libel
action may give evidence of... any public apology, correction, or retraction of the libelous matter
made and published by the defendant."); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-48 (Michie 1999) ("In any civil
action.., for libel or defamation ... the defendant, whether punitive damages be sought or not, may
introduce in evidence in mitigation of general and punitive damages, or either.., that apology or
retraction, if any, was made .... ); W. VA. CODE § 57-2-4 (1999) ("[T]he defendant... may give in
evidence in mitigation of damages that he made or offered an apology to the plaintiff for such
defamation before the commencement of the action, or as soon afterwards as he had an opportunity
of doing so ....
");see also Wagatsuma & Rosett, supra note 16, at 479-81 (discussing retraction
and apology at common law and stating that at least thirty states' statutes have incorporated
consideration of retractions and corrections).
In addition, the sanctions imposed in attorney discipline hearings seem to be lower in those cases
where the attorney has shown remorse. Rehm & Beatty, supranote 10, at 122-28.
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strategic value to both parties than they might otherwise. At best, the
evidence rules can be crafted to temper opportunism, but strategic
considerations cannot be eliminated altogether.
B.

A StrategicFramework

In this Section, we present a framework designed to detail the costs
and benefits of apology while at the same time remaining faithful to our
conclusion in Part II that some people, through emotional
precommitments, will not fully internalize the strategic considerations
associated with their behavior. No doubt individuals' propensities to
cooperate even when it is costly lie along a continuum. For simplicity of
exposition, however, we utilize Frank's classification of people into one
of two categories: good types, or cooperators, and bad types, or
defectors. Cooperators have the capacity to develop, and do in fact
develop, conscientious, morally good sentiments. They strive to keep
their promises, comply with shared norms, and refrain from harming
others. Cooperators' actions are influenced by both their preferences and
emotions that make these people more likely to behave well. They are
therefore less than fully responsive to the immediate external costs and
benefits of their behavior than are defectors. Defectors behave much
respond only to the
more like the stereotypical, purely rational actor: they
16
hand.
at
situation
the
of
benefits
and
costs
external
Suppose that a transgressor has done wrong in the sense that he has
violated a norm of responsible behavior that is shared between him and
another. The other, the victim, has been harmed in some way by the
transgression. Both know that the transgressor has violated this norm and
both know that the victim has suffered consequent harm. The
transgressor must decide whether to apologize to the victim. In response,
the victim must decide whether to pursue (or to continue to pursue) a
legal remedy. If cooperator transgressors apologize, they do so at least in
part because they feel an emotional need to correct a moral wrong. In
contrast, defector apologists act only out of a desire to benefit financially
and reputationally from the victim's sense of forgiveness. Thus, the costs
and benefits of such apology and forgiveness depend on the legal
treatment of the apology. We consider first a legal rule under which

216. Of course, good economists know better than to make such a claim. Economists assume that
people maximize their own utility, which depends on their preferences. Incorporating a preference
for good or moral behavior is by no means inconsistent with economic modeling. Thus, the real
distinction between cooperators and defectors in this article turns on whether this preference exists.
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evidence of apology is never admissible in a court of law and then
consider the effect of introducing apology into the courtroom.
1.

No Apology Evidence Admitted In Court

Suppose a state took the advice of apology advocates and forbade
evidence of apology in the courtroom. In a world without legal
considerations, the costs and benefits of apology would depend on a
number of factors. We consider the costs and benefits to transgressors of
offering an apology, and then consider the costs and benefits to victims
of forgiving the transgressor. These costs and benefits may be expressed
as functions of several variables that are defined throughout this
subsection.
A.

Costs And Benefits To Transgressors

Assume that the subjective benefits to the transgressor of an apology
include the following:
F = expected value of enhanced future benefits from the relationship.
The transgressor may hope to continue in the relationship, and
forgiveness presumably enhances the future benefits that are obtainable,
given the transgression. We assume that an apology has the potential to
repair the relationship better and faster than a failure to apologize,
because the apology communicates to the victim that the transgressor
does care about his relationship with the victim. If the transgressor has
no hope of continuing this relationship, then F = 0.
R = expected value of reputational enhancement from third parties.
The apology may have the potential to enhance the transgressor's
reputation with third parties even if the transgressor has no hope of
continuing his relationship with the victim." 7 Admittedly, the sign of this
variable will not always be positive, because sometimes an apology can
actually harm a transgressor's reputation. On the one hand, the fact that
the transgressor has apologized can signal that the transgressor is
basically a cooperator, which may enhance his reputation. On the other
hand, an apology does involve an admission of wrongdoing, which can
negatively affect one's reputation. Since an effective apology requires
that the transgressor at least temporarily place himself in a position of
relative powerlessness, the apologizer can be perceived as somewhat
217. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text (discussing social psychological theories
grounding apologies in transgressor's reputational concerns).
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weak. The reputational effect of an apology will depend on the factual
context, the previous reputation of the transgressor, and the individual
third parties involved.21 Moreover, the perceived sign of the effect on
reputation may vary according to the gender of the transgressor. 19
A = expected reduction/elimination of litigation costs.
As mentioned earlier, apology can diffuse the victim's hostility and
pave the way for the parties to resolve their difficulties on their own. The
longer a dispute drags out, the more costly it can be for the defendant
transgressor, who (at least in the United States) is stuck paying his own
legal expenses as they accrue. For those lawsuits where losing
defendants are liable for successful plaintiffs' attorney fees, apologies
can, by inducing settlement, reduce the transgressor's total litigation
costs even further.
D = expected value of reduced damages and liability.
An effective apology can have the effect of turning a wrong into a mere
misfortune of life. Although effective apologies entail an implied or
explicit reparation offer, forgiveness can include setting aside a claimed
right to compensation. Victims sometimes demand at least partial
compensation even when they accept apologies. Moreover, the less likely
their relationship will continue into the future, the more compensation
that is likely to be demanded. For example, spouses rarely demand
explicit compensation when they resolve their differences, but a mere
apology is unlikely sufficient for the uninsured driver rear-ended by a
careless stranger. In all cases, however, the transgressor imposes two
types of harm. First, the transgression causes some physical damage,
monetary expense, or simply consumes the victim's time. Second, the
transgression communicates a certain lack of respect for the dignity or
value of the victim and his time and possessions. Although the apology
cannot undo the first type of harm, it can mitigate the second type."0
Thus, the compensation demanded even by victims who are strangers can

213. Gang members, for example, may perceive apology as a sign of weakness, whereas teachers,
mediators and counselors may more favorably interpret apologies.
219. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text (discussing potential sex differences in
apologetic behavior).
220. Of course, the costs associated with the second type of harm turn on the severity of the
transgressiofi, which in turn depends on the state of mind of the transgressor. Intentional or reckless
transgressions may produce more emotional harm than merely negligent transgressions. Moreover,
the more the victim values her relationship with the transgressor, the greater this second harm is
likely to be. Strangers can impose emotional harms, no doubt, but we are more vulnerable to those
we care about.
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be lower after an apology because the victim's perceived harm is
lower-at a minimum, the apology can "subtract insult from injury."'"
G = subjective value of relief of guilty feelings.
To the extent that one harbors guilt by failing to apologize, the act of
apology can be cathartic for the transgressor. An apology typically shifts
the moral burden (and hence at least part of the associated guilt feelings)
from transgressor to victim to either forgive or justify a refusal to do
so.222

Assuming initially that an apology plays no formal role in litigation,
the costs to the transgressor of an apology include:
H = subjective cost associated with humiliation and shame.
Although we have focused on human tastes for apology after
wrongdoing, some transgressors would choose not to apologize even in
the absence of legal consequences. Because apologies require a focus on
the transgression and an admission of wrongdoing, the apologist
inevitably experiences shame and humiliation.'
Stated differently,
apology entails emotional costs and benefits that seem to vary across
individuals.
We assume that cooperator apologists differ from defector apologizers
in that the defector simply weighs the costs and benefits to apology while
cooperator apologizers' moral sentiments cause them to, in effect, mute
the costs of apology. As a consequence, defector decisions to apologize
are purely strategic. Given our assumptions, the defector apologizes if:
FD+RD+D +A>HD.
In contrast, the cooperator apologizes if:
FC + RC + D + A + G > HC-C,where 0 <C < 1.
Here we assume that the cooperator discounts the costs to apology by
some muting factor C, which takes some value between zero and one.
This muting factor is incorporated to reflect the idea that although the
cooperator takes costs of apology into account the cooperator, by
assumption, fails to fully internalize those costs. The lower is C, the
greater the costs to apology must be before the transgressor is willing to
be deterred from apologizing. We have assumed that the cooperator has
the biological capacity to develop moral sentiments that keep C relatively
low, but note that societies often work hard to provide environmental
221. Advising Clients, supranote 7, at 1019.
222. Orenstein, supra note 17, at 244 (noting that person who receives apology bears social
responsibility to the offender to forgive).
223. See supranote 99 (discussing difficulty of apologizing).
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factors that help to lower C for these individuals. Parents teach their
children the importance of apology. Religions teach their members the
importance of asking for forgiveness, as well as the importance of
forgiving. Finally, schools, civic groups, and mass media all focus in
varying degrees on the development of moral sentiments. Moral
sentiments can have the effect of enhancing G while lowering C, and, in
both cases, increasing the likelihood that a cooperator transgressor will
apologize for his wrongdoing.
There are other potentially relevant differences between cooperator
and defector transgressors. We anticipate that a defector is more likely to
transgress in the future than is a cooperator. Therefore, the value of
future benefits from the relationship are probably greater for the
cooperator than they are for the defector: 4 FC > FD.
Moreover, for similar reasons, the reputational enhancement for
cooperators is likely greater than it is for defectors, who have had
previous, or will have future, cause for transgression: RC > RD.
Finally, although the cooperator mutes the costs of apology, those
costs, in terms of humiliation and shameful feelings, are greater for
cooperators than they are for defectors. In other words, the strategic
apologizer is less affected by humiliation and shame than is the
apologizer who responds to emotional influences: Hc > -D.
Given the framework, we cannot conclude that cooperators are
necessarily more likely to apologize than are defectors. The benefits to
apology seem to be clearly greater for cooperators than they are for
defectors, but the cost components for apology may run in conflicting
directions. Put differently, the emotional components that make up the
cognitive dissonance for transgressors-shame and humiliation on the
one hand and relief from guilty feelings on the other-are all stronger for
cooperators than for defectors. On balance, the greater benefits to
apology and the muting of costs lead us to believe that cooperators are, in
fact, more likely to apologize. It is theoretically possible, however, that a
cooperator transgressor's increased feelings of shame and humiliation
could outweigh the other factors, making the cooperator less likely to
apologize. It does appear, though, that cooperators' decisions whether to
apologize are differently motivated than are defector decisions.

224. Indeed, if we only take the value of the future of the relationship into account, defectors may
have no incentive to apologize, at least to the extent that the function of apology is limited to
bonding oneself to future cooperation with the victim.
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Costs And Benefits To Victim

If the victim receives an apology, he must decide whether to forgive
the transgressor. We assume here that if the victim perceives that the
transgressor's apology was insincere or strategically rather than
emotionally motivated, then the victim chooses to sue the transgressor.2 z
In other words, we assume that moralistic aggression causes victims to
behave out of spite if they think that the apology was motivated by a
desire to obtain yet another benefit from the victim. We assume further
that in the event that a victim chooses to forgive the transgressor, he is
willing to accept less than full compensation for his injury.
We do not assume, however, that the victim necessarily forgives the
transgressor once he receives an apology that he perceives to be sincere.
We assume that victims, as well as transgressors, can be cooperators or
defectors. The intuition that a victim could opportunistically use an
apology to her advantage underlies the apology advocates' calls to
exclude evidence of apology at trial. Even if the apology cannot be
introduced at trial, it can be used to prove fault to third-party observers.
The defector victim forgives only if the present tangible benefits exceed
their costs. The cooperator victim mutes these costs because he
experiences guilt if he fails to forgive.
Given a perceived sincere apology, the victim's subjective benefits to
forgiveness include:
FV = victim's expected value of future benefits from relationship.
Although it is not necessary to forgiveness that the victim desire to
continue her relationship with the transgressor, we assume that the more
the victim values her relationship with the transgressor, the more likely
that she will forgive him. Of course, these future benefits may turn on the
nature of the present offense, given that there is always some chance that
the transgression will repeat itself, even when the transgressor sincerely
apologizes. If the victim perceives no future benefits to continuing her
relationship with the transgressor, then FV = 0.
RV = expected value of reputational enhancement with third
parties.
As with apology, the reputational effect of forgiveness may be
ambiguous. Apology may enhance the victim's reputation because it is in
general virtuous to be seen as a forgiving person. On the other hand, the
victim who forgives easily may be seen as a "chump" or a "pushover"
225. Bartels, supra note 18, at 150; Bolstad, supra note 16, at 550.
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and may become the recipient of more strategically motivated apologies
in the future. Mob bosses may suffer negative reputational consequences
to forgiving, but priests likely suffer negative consequences for failing to
forgive. As with the apologizer's reputational effect, the sign and
magnitude of this variable will turn on the particulars of the situation, the
victim, and the third parties involved.
AV = expected reduction/elimination of costs of suit.
To the extent that the victim can avoid a lawsuit, he benefits by the
amount of6 time and other resources he would have devoted to
22
litigation.
SV = relief of angry, spiteful feelings.
Moralistic aggression is both psychologically and physiologically
costly. Resentment and anger crowd out more pleasant thoughts and
experiences, and produce all the negative physical side effects that stress
produces. 7 Because we assume that cooperators and defectors differ
with respect to whether they respond to emotionally-based incentives, we
assume here that SV = 0 for defectors.
The costs of forgiveness include, by previous assumption:
D = expected value of reduced damages/liability.
The defector victim forgives the transgressor if:
FVD + RVD + AV > D,
whereas the cooperator victim forgives if:
FVC + RVC + AV + SV > C-D, 0 -<C<1.
Here we assume that the cooperator discounts the costs to forgiveness
by some muting factor C, which takes some value between zero and one.
The lower is C, the greater the costs to forgiveness must be before the
victim is deterred from forgiving. Moreover, because defector victims
are more likely to both strategically refuse to forgive and themselves
transgress in the future than are cooperator victims, we anticipate that
FVC > FVD.
226. If the victim hires a lawyer, AV is, of course, smaller when the lawyer is paid by
contingency fee than when the lawyer is paid on a per hour basis.
227. For scientific evidence that stress produces harmful physiological effects in the brain, see
Robert Sapolsky, Why Stress is Bad for Your Brain, SCIENCE, Aug. 9, 1996, at 749. The release of
anger and spite constitute the essence of forgiveness. See Symposium, The Role of Forgiveness in
the Lmv, 27 FORDHAM URB. UJ. 1351, 1355 (2000) (remarks of Jeffrey Murphy) (describing
forgiveness as "the overcoming, on moral grounds, of... the vindictive passions of resentment,
anger, hatred, and the desire for revenge ... ").
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Furthermore, because defector victims are more likely to use
forgiveness strategically in the future, we anticipate that
RVC > RVD.
The basic idea is that one's reputation for being forgiving signals that
one is a cooperator, but defectors will eventually erode some of the
potential reputational gain from forgiving. Thus, on average we can
expect that, all else equal, a cooperator gets more reputational value from
forgiving than does a defector. If these assumptions are reasonable, then
cooperator victims can be expected to forgive more readily in the face of
a perceived sincere apology than will defector victims because the
benefits are uniformly larger and the costs uniformly smaller.
2.

Apology Evidence Admitted To EstablishLiability

So far we have assumed that apology plays no formal role at trial.
Suppose instead, as is often the case in the U.S., that evidence of a
transgressor's apology is admissible at trial to establish the transgressor's
liability. We consider here the effect of admissibility on the incidence of
apology.
A.

Costs And Benefits To Transgressor

As recognized by the apology advocates, apologies become more
costly to transgressors when they can be introduced at trial to establish
fault. The evidentiary rule increases the expected value of the trial award
by increasing the probability that the victim will win his case. Building
on the framework, we must add to the costs of apology:
L = enhanced expected value of trial award.
The defector now apologizes only if:
FD +RD +D +A>L+HD.
The cooperator's apology now requires that:
Fc+Rc +D +A+ G> (L + Hc)-C
Notice that although the costs of apology rise for both cooperators and
defectors, defector apologies are relatively more discouraged than are
cooperator apologies, where the costs are muted. In other words, overall
both strategic and sincere apologies can be discouraged, but on the
margin, more strategic apology will be discouraged than sincere
apologies. Whether introduction of apology at trial is good or bad
ultimately turns on an assessment of the relative importance of sincere
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and insincere apologies. In the end, we must determine whether we care
more about overdeterring a few sincere apologies by admitting apology
evidence or underdeterring more insincere apologies by excluding them.
This judgment turns in part on which category we care more about. The
apology advocates appear to care more about encouraging the sincere
apologies, whereas Taft is more concerned with discouraging the
strategic ones. However, a more complete analysis of the effect of the
evidence rule includes consideration of victim behavior as well.
B.

Costs And Benefits To Victim

Although introduction of apology at trial can temper the use of
strategic apologies, it enhances the opportunistic use of apology by
victims. Prior to its admissibility, an apology could be disclosed to third
parties, but, with admissibility, an apology also can be brought to trial to
enhance the expected award. Thus, we must add L to the cost of
forgiveness as well as the cost of apology because forgiveness now
requires the victim to forgo this larger expected damage award. Thus, the
defector victim forgives if:
FVD + RVD + AV > D + L,
and the cooperator victim forgives if:
FVC + RVC + AV + SV > (D + L).C.
The effect of the evidence rule on forgiveness is relatively greater for
defectors. Although it is possible that the increased damages award is so
large that even a cooperator victim will choose to sue rather than forgive,
it is much more likely that the defector victim will decline to forgive.
In sum, the introduction of apology at trial ultimately discourages
opportunistic apologies, but only at the cost of increasing opportunistic
lawsuits. At the same time, both sincere apologies and cooperator
forgiveness are less likely, though by how much (if at all) they are
actually discouraged we cannot say.
3.

Apology Evidence Admitted To Mitigate Damages

Although largely ignored in the evidentiary debate, apology evidence
sometimes may be introduced at the damages phase of trial. At the
liability phase the victim introduces apology to prove the transgressor's
fault, but here the transgressor introduces his apology to reduce or
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eliminate punitive damages or other liability. 228 How does introduction of
this evidence at the damages phase affect apology and forgiveness? We
will initially assume that the evidence is not also admissible at the
liability phase.
Here we must add to the original list of transgressor benefits to
apology:
P = decreased expected value of trial award.
Without reproducing the equations set forth in the previous section, it
seems fairly intuitive that when evidence of apology is admissible to
mitigate damages but not to establish liability, a marginal increase in
apologies can be expected. Some of this apology is purely strategic,
which means that victims may respond to this increased use of strategic
apologies with increased suspicion regarding the sincerity of the apology.
However, to the extent that an apology is still perceived as sincere, the
likelihood of forgiveness increases because its costs are reduced by P. In
other words, failing to forgive yields victims less under this evidentiary
rule than it would if apology evidence were entirely inadmissible.
Opportunistic victim behavior is tempered when the apology is
introduced at the damages phase, but only at the cost of increased
opportunistic apologies.
4.

Apology Evidence Admitted At Both LiabilityAnd DamagesPhase

Finally, consider an evidence rule that allows the introduction of
apology at both the liability and damages phases of trial. As mentioned
earlier,2 2 some state statutes specifically permit evidence of an apology
to be considered when determining damages. More importantly, to the
extent that a trial is not bifurcated, and relatively few are, then nothing
stops the fact finder from considering the apology evidence submitted at
trial in determining the appropriate damages amount. Under a rule where
apology evidence can be considered in determining fault as well as
damages in a non-bifurcated trial, we combine the two evidence rules
discussed above. Consequently, we add P to the benefits of apology
while adding L to its costs. Similarly, we add L to the costs of
forgiveness while subtracting P. Thus, the cooperator transgressor
apologizes if:
FC + RC + D + A + G +P > (L + HC)-C.

228. See supra note 215.
229. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.

1182

On Apology and Consilience
The defector transgressor apologizes if:
FD + RD + D + A + P> L + HD.
The cooperator victim forgives if:
FVc + RVC + AV + SV> (D + L - P)-C.
And, the defector victim forgives if:
FVD+RVD+AV>D+L-P.
At first blush it may seem that introducing apology evidence at both
phases of litigation is optimal. Introducing apology at the liability phase
reduces strategic apologies and introducing it at the damages phase
reduces opportunistic refusals to forgive. Notice, however, that in all four
of these equations, L and P (the effects of introducing apology at the
liability and damages phases respectively) are offsetting each other. If
they are equivalent, then introducing apology at both phases is
indistinguishable, in terms of the incentives it creates, from a world
where apology evidence is entirely inadmissible in court (the first
scenario we considered). Even if they are not exactly equivalent, the fact
that they offset one another leads us to conclude that in general, party
incentives likely differ little between a regime where apology evidence is
entirely inadmissible in court and one where apology evidence can be
considered by the fact finder to determine both fault and damages.
Our conclusion requires a caveat. We have so far assumed that L (the
increase in expected damages associated with increasing the probability
of being found liable) and P (the decrease in expected damages
associated with the use of apology to mitigate blameworthiness) are more
or less the same. However, in some cases the parties care much more
about being found liable and in others they care much more about being
found blameworthy. Consider, for example, a suit that involves a
contract with a liquidated damages provision. An apology can affect L
because it helps prove that defendant breached the contract. Because the
damages in the event of breach are predetermined, however, P = 0.
Conversely, consider a convicted criminal seeking parole. If the parole
board considers the fact that the criminal apologized to his victim, the
criminal may receive a lighter sentence by being paroled. At that point,
however, the apology has no effect on the likelihood of conviction,
which occurred much earlier. In both of these examples, considering
apology evidence to establish both fault and blameworthiness results in
adding to the net strategic incentives of one of the parties.
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The Apology Debate Reconsidered

We can draw a few normative conclusions about the admissibility of
apology evidence. First, because both parties have the potential to use
apology strategically at trial, introduction of apology at one phase
should, where possible, be counterbalanced with introduction of apology
evidence at the other phase as well. Otherwise, opportunistic behavior by
one party or the other becomes a problem. When the evidence is
admissible only to establish liability, then victim opportunism becomes
costly. When the evidence is admissible only to reduce damages, then
transgressor opportunism becomes costly on balance.
Second, in choosing between the two remaining evidence rules-one
where apology evidence is entirely inadmissible and one where it can be
admitted at both the damages and liability phases-consideration of the
incentives these rules create for the parties appears largely unhelpful. It
seemed intuitively obvious that admitting apology evidence to establish
liability would discourage apologies. Nevertheless, the apology analysts
have neglected to adequately consider the fact that apology evidence also
might be used in court to mitigate damages, and that this admission can
encourage apologies. For both apology and forgiveness, the incentives
created by admitting apology evidence at the liability phase are offset by
the incentives created when the evidence is also considered by the fact
finder at the damages phase. Except for the caveat we mentioned earlier,
any differences in apologetic or forgiving behavior between these two
remaining rules are likely too trivial to warrant much attention from
policy makers.
Notice that the strength of Taft's argument, compelling as it seemed at
first glance, also dissipates upon closer scrutiny. To Taft, reforming the
evidentiary rules threatens to undermine the essential moral value of
apology. 3 Recall that to Taft, it is the very costliness of an apology that
makes it worthwhile as a method of dispute resolution." However, once
we consider the legal and practical reality that apology evidence can be
used by the fact finder in determining both fault and damages, the
admissibility of apology evidence makes the apology neither
systematically more nor less costly than the legal regime that Taft argues
so strenuously against. Because the incentives to apologize are unlikely
to differ much under either rule, his commodification argument is
ultimately unconvincing.

230. Supra note 213 and accompanying text.
231. Supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, Taft seems to think that transgressors have no reason to use
apology strategically in the absence of the participation of lawyers. Once
apology and forgiveness are viewed in an evolutionary economic
perspective, however, it becomes clear that their strategic value existed
long before the introduction of lawyers into dispute resolution. Apology
and forgiveness have the potential to facilitate the continuation of the
parties' relationship, enable the transgressor to avoid compensation, and
enhance the reputations of both parties in the community. These
pragmatic considerations can never be completely separated from the
moral nature of the activities. Moreover, the relative importance of the
strategic considerations likely has much more to do with the essential
character of the individuals as cooperators or defectors than it does with
the presence of lawyers.
The apology scholars have likewise ignored the fact that the formal
legal system is not structured to help people preserve and continue their
relationships. Instead, courts are much better equipped to assist those
who have decided to dissolve their relationships. One essential role of the
courts is to ensure that people part company on terms that are fair to
both, and to do so in a manner that helps to create incentives by others to
reasonably cooperate. To the extent that apology evidence assists the
court in discerning truth, determining fault, and ascertaining culpability,
it tends to serve these objectives. But note that these are fundamentally
different reasons to admit evidence of apology than the ones proffered by
the apology advocates.
An evolutionary economic analysis may offer useful insights into
other legal or ethical treatments of apology. First, as several scholars
have noted, corporate and other business structures can encourage a party
to act rationally. If emotional and other cognitive biases prevent
individuals from behaving rationally, businesses can sometimes organize
themselves in a manner that enables the individuals collectively to make
more efficient decisions. 23 2 In general, this organization is beneficial
because more efficient decision making enables society to maximize the
value of scarce resources. However, in the context of apology, the
organization can be problematic because decision making that
232. See generally CHIP HEATH ET AL., Cognitive Repairs: How OrganizationalPractices Can
Compensatefor IndividualShortcomings, in 20 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1 (1998);
Robert K. Rasmussen, BehavioralEconomics, The Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy Law and the
Pricing of Credit, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1679, 1688-90 (1998) (discussing fact that some but not all
cognitive biases may be corrected in the institutional context); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized
Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why CorporationsMislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause
Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REv. 101 (1997) (discussing positive and negative effects of
cognitive bias toward optimism that seems to survive within organizations).
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approaches or resembles rational calculation in the context of apology
also approaches the decision making of defectors. Put differently,
apology can be used as a tool for organizations to strategically take
advantage of individual victims' instincts to forgive in the face of
apology.
To elaborate, behavioral biologists emphasize the fact that our brains
are a product of our evolution, and that they tend to be better equipped to
handle situations commonly encountered in the environment of
evolutionary adaptation (EEA) than more modem changes in our
environments. 3 As pointed out earlier,"4 our sophisticated cognitive
capacities help us mitigate the negative effects of using our evolved
predispositions in our more modem era, but those predispositions can be
expected to cause us to behave less than purely rationally at times."
Scientists believe that in the EEA, people banded together and interacted
in small groups." 6 Because of the social structure in the EEA, virtually
all of our interactions were repeat interactions, which means that a
predisposition to cooperate would be adaptive for some portion of the
population. In the context of transgressions, cooperation entails a
propensity to forgive in the face of a perceived heartfelt apology. To
some extent, this predisposition to forgive promotes conflict resolution
even for strangers. The evolutionary perspective suggests that we are
predisposed to treat our interactions as iterative, even when they are not.
Thus people are more likely to cooperate in one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma
context than economists would predict. 7 If so, then the strategic
framework presented in Section B, although presupposing the potential
for the continuation of a relationship, is largely applicable to dispute
resolution among strangers.
An organization-whether government, corporation, or other
association-can take advantage of victims' predisposition to forgive in
order to minimize its liabilities. No doubt victims might be more
suspicious of apologies proffered by organizations. However, deception
233. See Leda Cosmides, The Logic of Social Exchange: Has Natural Selection Shaped How
Humans Reason?, 31 COGNITION 187 (1989); Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality, supra note 178, at
1167.
234. Supra note 119 and accompanying text.
235. Supra note 120 and accompanying text.
236. See Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality, supra note 178, at 1176-77 (discussing evolutionary
processes and their likely effect on cooperative behavior).
237. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and BehavioralSciences: Removing the
Rationality Assumption From Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051, 1128 (1994) (using
tipping behavior as example); FRANK, supranote 69, at 140. Cf Berg, et. al, supranote 197 (finding
surprisingly large degree of cooperation in experiments with extended form game).
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and discernment might be an arms race at which the organization,
through specialization of individual employee tasks, can excel. After all,
formal organizations presumably did not exist in the EEA. As a result,
we may be predisposed to think of dispute resolution in the dyadic,
individual-to-individual context and prone (although by no means
guaranteed) to ignore the institutional nature of the transgressor. An
institution that wishes to exploit victims' cognitive and emotional
structures will send its most empathic employee or member to apologize
to the victim. Although the organization may be using the apology
strategically, the individual who is sent credibly may convey a sense of
heartfelt remorse for harming the victim. Some, though perhaps not all,
victims will respond to the individual rather than the organization and
agree to settle their claims.
As an ethical matter then, we might wish to rethink Jonathan Cohen's
argument that lawyers should encourage hospitals to offer apologies as a
means to lower liability costs. 8 The apology takes advantage of
individual predispositions to forgive, and, it may deflect hostilities
towards those blameworthy individuals who may not be able to take
advantage of specialization within an organizational structure, namely
doctors. In addition, plaintiffs' attorneys can serve an important role in
discouraging their clients from waiving their rights to compensation in
the face of apology. The attorney can help her clients overcome their
cognitive and emotional biases,' 9 but many victims never get to the point
of hiring legal counsel. We therefore suggest rethinking the
enforceability of liability releases that are signed by victims who
received no independent legal counsel.
The analysis above also suggests that apology and forgiveness have
greater implications for the conduct of mediation than they have for
formal litigation. Protected by special confidentiality rules and
evidentiary exclusion rules,24 most mediations today already serve as
safe harbors for apology.24' The special protections afforded to
communications in mediation offset any incentives that are created by
the evidentiary rules in litigation discussed above.242 The predominant
activity that occurs in mediation is negotiation. Effective negotiation
238. See Cohen, supra note 9.
239. See generally Korobkin & Guthrie, supranote 11.
240. See NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE
(1989).
241. Advising Clients, supra note 7, at 1036-40 (discussing the pros and cons of mediation as a
legally-protected forum for making "safe" apologies).
242. See supraPart III.B.1.
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requires some cooperation, and cooperation requires a certain degree of
trust. After a transgression, the victim is less likely to trust the
transgressor and the transgressor has reason to distrust the victim who
might respond with moralistic aggression. Apology and forgiveness help
establish trust after a defection thereby creating the possibility of further
cooperation and even reconciliation. Apology might-help the transgressor
reestablish himself as a cooperator in the perception of the victim, and
forgiveness might reassure him that the victim will not retaliate with a
transgression of his own. Mediation is thus a forum that enables each
party to explore whether the other is a defector or cooperator, and
apology can help facilitate the process.
Not surprisingly, several commentators have promoted apology in the
context of mediation. 43 Most mediations are referred by the courts or
submitted by the disputants because the parties are at an impasse in their
negotiations. If distrust is at the root of the impasse, apology seems a
good place for the mediator to start. Of course, the delay between a
transgression and mediation can doom an effective apology. 244 Moreover,
some conjecture that not all mediation styles are conducive to apology.245
Nevertheless, because most seasoned mediators are flexible,246 as a
practical matter good mediators would -advocate or certainly not
discourage apology if they saw some potential in its promoting the
goal(s) of the mediation.247

243. See, e.g., STEPHEN GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION 159-62 (3d ed. 1999)
(commenting on the potential for apology in mediation); Marshall H. Tanick & Teresa J. Ayling,
Alternative Dispute Resolution by Apology: Settlement by Saying "I'm Sony,"HENNEPIN LAWYER,
July-Aug. 1996, at 22 (arguing for proactive use of apology in mediation); Levi, supra note 10
(attempting to ferret out the best situations, factors to maximize beneficial use of apology in
mediation); and, Latif, supra note 19 (promoting partial and safe apologies both in and out of
mediation as serving other desirable purposes).
244. Advising Clients, supra note 7, at 1038 (noting that the time lag between the onset of the
dispute and mediation allows for the conflict to escalate).
245. Levi, supranote 10, at 1192-93.
246. See generally Dwight Golann, Variations in Mediation: How-and Why---Legal Mediators
Change Styles in the Course of a Case, 2000 J.DiSp. RESOL. 41 (2000) (discussing the flexibility of
experienced mediators).
247. Different mediators and disputants may come to the forum with different goals. Settlement
of the lawsuit is the goal of most lawyer-mediators because caseload is largely referred by the courts.
Other mediators may promote other goals such as reconciliation or recognition and empowerment.
Our model assumes that the parties as well as outside observers agree that one party has violated a
shared norm in some manner that has harmed the other party. When the fact of a transgression is not
so clear, however, mediation can be a mechanism for the parties to discuss the facts and state their
positions so as to eventually determine whether a shared norm has been violated.
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However, some commentators have cautioned strongly against the
unreflective use of apology in mediation.24 Stressing again the likely
cheapening of the moral value of the apologetic act, Taft seems
particularly incensed by the suggestion that lawyers and mediators advise
parties to issue partial apologies in mediations.24 9 Here, we agree with
Taft that proponents of partial apology both within and outside of the
protected environment of mediation misunderstand the effect of such
apologies on dispute resolution.250 However, our agreement does not rest
on the subjective moral principles enunciated by Taft, but rather on
principles of evolutionary biology.
From the evolutionary economic analysis discussed above, the
apologetic interchange is essentially an exchange of signals that each
party attempts to decipher and interpret. An effective apology must be a
reliable signal. If apology is a signal to induce the victim to risk
reestablishing cooperative behavior, then under the handicap principle,
its cost to the apologizer must be sufficient to assure the victim of its
credibility. Partial apologies and apologies made in mediation are
insulated from the monetary risks and public exposure that surround
apologies revealed in litigation. When an apology is cheap, and
therefore, an unreliable indicator of the transgressor's cooperative stance,
the victim is more likely to require that the transgressor incur additional
costs in the form of compensation." More importantly, although partial
apologies could produce some cathartic effect,152 in general such
protected apologies will be less likely to induce cooperation and
reconciliation. As a mediator, one of us has experienced the negative
reaction when, for example, an insurance adjuster begins a mediation
with a costless partial apology by saying to the plaintiff, "I'm sorry you
were hurt, but I'm only authorized to offer you the same amount
previously offered." Limiting exposure in this manner is self-defeating.
248. Taft, supra note 18, at 1148-50 (attacking the use of partial apologies and safe apologies
made in mediation); Levi, supra note 10, at 1180-81, 1188 (generally warning that "happy-ending"
apologies are rare and that partial and coerced apologies are less effective); Advising Clients, supra
note 9, at 1018 (advising against coercion of apologies).
249. Taft, supranote 18, at 1148-50.
250. Id.
251. Mark Bennett & Christopher Dewberry, "I've Said I'm Sony, Haven't IP" A Study of the
Identity Implications and Constraints That Apologies Createfor Their Recipients, 13 CURRENT
PSYCHOL. 10, 17-18 (1994) (victims feel constrained to accept proffered apologies but may impose
additional conditions when the apology is unconvincing).
252. See generally Latif, supra note 19, at 311-19 (praising the possible positive effects of
coerced, partial, and safe apologies). The Truth and Reconciliation Commission experience in South
Africa suggests a cathartic effect on a national scale but has also led to concerns over justice and has
arguably not promoted true reconciliation. Gibson, supranote 2.
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Negotiation in mediation can backfire with partial apologies, and full
apologies offered by credible deceivers and organizations can be
exploitative. These difficulties can be compounded by the intervention of
apology-advocating third-party mediators. Mediators specialize in
finding ways to eliminate lawsuits, but especially because they tend not
to know the parties well, they are particularly ill suited to judge the
credibility of an apology. A party who is pressured to apologize may do
so with less sincerity than if his conscience would have led him to act.
The pressured victim, in turn, who is more likely to detect the insincerity,
may leave the table feeling bitter, frustrated, and under-compensated.
The issue of consciously strategic apology deserves much more
attention than we give it here. It seems, at first glance, that apology
advocacy and coaching by attorneys and mediators can cause harm both
because these third parties may misinterpret the parties' signals and
because these third parties can end up distorting those signals. When a
transgressor is coached to offer an apology, that coaching can help to
make the apology appear to the victim to be more sincere than it actually
is. Moreover, the mediator or attorney who encourages the victim to
accept an apology may make separate representations about the
transgressor's remorse. Both the coaching and the representations can, in
many contexts, be very helpful to the genuinely remorseful but reserved
transgressor. Without coaching the reserved transgressor would fail to
send the intended signals. Unfortunately, however, coaching can deceive
the victim into believing that she has received a sincere full apology
when in fact a strategic partial apology had been proffered. In these latter
circumstances, coaching and representations could result in the
acceptance of a fundamentally unfair, grossly inequitable, or even
unrealistic and inoperable settlement. Such potentially abusive outcomes
tend to cast suspicion on sincere apologies in subsequent mediations.
Moreover, they potentially undermine the integrity of the mediation
process itself.
In sum, the proponents of partial and protected apologies in mediation
recognize the deeply ingrained power of apology and forgiveness and
understand how mediation provides a unique forum within which to
facilitate them. The critics fear their abuse. An economic evolutionary
perspective begins to uncover why apology is so powerful and is so
susceptible to abuse in the context of mediation.
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CONCLUSION
Three goals motivated this Article. First, we hoped to show that
insights from evolutionary biology can help us to better understand
some, if not all, of the powerful emotions that underlie apology and
forgiveness. Second, we hoped to convince scholars in law and
economics that the strategic dispute resolution models can and should
incorporate apology and forgiveness, at least informally. Finally, we
hoped to incorporate the results of our strategic framework into an
analysis of the evidence rules surrounding apologies-a topic of
significant current scholarly and legislative interest.
Our framework helped to focus attention on party opportunism and the
effect that the evidence rules have on the strategic behavior of both
transgressors and victims. Once we recognize that evidence of apology
can be introduced either to establish liability or to mitigate damages, it
becomes clear that mutual opportunism is possible. To counteract
strategic considerations of both parties, we conclude that in general
evidence of apology should be considered either at both or at neither
phase of the trial. The choice between the two ultimately turns on
considerations other than either the incidence or essential morality of
apology. Moreover, because courts are notoriously unsuited to encourage
parties to get along with one another, they instead focus their attention on
determining the truth of the allegations and establishing just parting
terms for the parties. With these goals in mind, evidence of apology at
both the liability phase (to help determine truth and fault) and at the
damages phase (to determine culpability) seems quite useful.
The evolutionary economic perspective indicates that some but not all
people should feel an emotional urge to forgive in the face of a heartfelt
apology. Moreover, some will be predisposed to forgive even strangers
and organizations. Organizations can exploit victims' predispositions,
raising important ethical considerations for the lawyers involved. In
addition, mediators need to think more carefully about the circumstances
under which they encourage apology and the manner in which they
facilitate the offering and acceptance of apologies.
Apology and forgiveness have important implications for our criminal
justice system and for public discourse. Ideally, we would apply our
analytic framework to all aspects of apology and forgiveness in conflict
resolution. Even the more limited initial undertaking in this Article was,
in important ways, much too broad for us to believe that we have
definitively resolved any one of the three issues this Article did address.
Further work to refine the biological analysis and to formalize the
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economic model of apology and forgiveness is in order. Either of these
exercises ultimately could affect our analysis of apology in the courts.
Nevertheless, we believe that this Article has made a significant
contribution toward consilience-linking evolutionary theory to
economic theory in ways that prove valuable to lawyers seeking more
effective theories and explanations of human behaviort
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